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J O S H U A  P .  Z O F F E R  
An Avoidance Canon for Erie: Using Federalism to 
Resolve Shady Grove’s Conﬂicts Analysis Problem 
abstract.  Eight years ago, the Supreme Court’s tripartite split in Shady Grove Orthopedic As-
sociates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co. highlighted a troublesome lacuna in the Court’s Erie jurispru-
dence. That case revealed that where it is ambiguous whether a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
and a state law conﬂict, the Court has no standard doctrinal method for resolving that ambiguity. 
This gap matters for our federal-state balance. Under the approach developed in Sibbach v. Wilson 
& Co. and affirmed in Hanna v. Plumer, once a valid Federal Rule is deemed to conﬂict with a state 
law, it displaces that state law in federal court. Thus, the operative question for whether state laws, 
even those with substantive purposes, will apply in federal court is whether a court believes there 
is a conﬂict. Recently, federal courts have struggled to reach consistent results in the face of this 
doctrinal gap. Divergent approaches to such Erie conﬂicts have opened circuit splits on a number 
of issues, ranging from the applicability of certain provisions of anti-SLAPP statutes to state plead-
ing requirements. 
 This Note proposes a federalism-based avoidance canon to ﬁll in this gap. Under this canon, 
federal courts facing a potential conﬂict would ﬁrst ask whether there is a plausible interpretation 
of the Federal Rule in question that does not conﬂict with the relevant state law based on its text 
and, if necessary, Advisory Committee Notes. If there is, they would default to that interpretation; 
if there is not, they would apply the Court’s standard approach from Hanna and Sibbach. This 
Note ﬁrst evaluates the history of Erie conﬂicts and how the Court arrived at its result in Shady 
Grove. The Note then explores the role that statutory interpretation can play in resolving the Shady 
Grove split, especially through avoidance canons. Next, the Note offers ﬁve arguments in favor of 
this canon rooted in federalism, separation of powers, and institutional choice concerns and ad-
dresses several counterarguments and potential alternatives. It concludes by demonstrating how 
this canon would operate in the context of two ostensible conﬂicts that have produced circuit splits 
in recent years. 
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introduction 
The Erie doctrine has long been a legal enigma, perplexing generations of 
lawyers from ﬁrst-year procedure students to federal judges.
1
 Erie’s guidance for 
choosing between federal and state law in diversity actions has suffered from 
ambiguity on several counts. Courts and commentators have struggled to deﬁne 
the boundary between substance and procedure; to determine whether and how 
that boundary should be drawn differently for federal procedural statutes, rules, 
and practices; and to identify the source of law that supplies the relevant stand-
ard for adjudication in each of those contexts. In situations governed by the 
Rules Enabling Act (REA), those involving a Federal Rule, Erie cases have faced 
a greater ambiguity: how to identify the existence of a conﬂict between a Federal 
Rule and state law necessitating application of the Erie doctrine in the ﬁrst place.
2
 
In 2010, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co. high-
lighted a lacuna in the Supreme Court’s Erie jurisprudence: there is no settled 
doctrinal approach for determining whether a Federal Rule and a state law actu-
ally conﬂict when there are multiple plausible interpretations of the Federal 
Rule.
3
 Indeed, in Shady Grove, the Justices applied three distinct conﬂicts meth-
odologies, yielding contradictory results and highlighting the extent of the doc-
trinal confusion over Erie conﬂicts.
4
 
This question matters, particularly for our federal-state balance and the sep-
aration of powers. The plurality in Shady Grove affirmed the reading of the Rules 
Enabling Act adopted in Hanna v. Plumer and Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., which 
allows any Federal Rule that is arguably procedural to displace conﬂicting state 
 
1. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA and 
Shady Grove, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2012) (“Erie analysis is notorious for the puzzles it has 
produced.”). 
2. See Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules Enabling Act After Shady 
Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1131, 1135-36 (2011). 
3. 559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010). This gap had not been lost on commentators. See Earl C. Dudley, Jr. 
& George Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal Rules: An Essay on What’s Wrong with Recent Erie 
Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707, 737 (2006) (“That leaves conﬂicts between the Federal Rules 
and state law as the principal arena in which controversies persist under the Erie doctrine.”); 
Allan Erbsen, Erie’s Starting Points: The Potential Role of Default Rules in Structuring Choice of 
Law Analysis, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 125, 146-47 (2013) (“The scope of a federal rule is often 
the central disputed issue in Erie cases, yet the Court has tied itself in knots trying to explain 
how to determine that scope.” (footnote omitted)). 
4. See Margaret S. Thomas, Constraining the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Through the Federalism 
Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 187, 210-12 (2013). 




 Under that reading, the operative question for the survival of a state law in 
federal diversity actions is whether the law is really in conﬂict with a Federal 
Rule; if so, the state law won’t apply.
6
 But as the concurrence and dissent both 
observed in Shady Grove, state laws that are facially procedural will often be 
bound up with important state regulatory and policy goals.
7
 The application of 
the Hanna-Sibbach approach thus substantially inhibits the effect of these state 
policy judgments when litigants ﬁnd themselves in federal court and the state 
law is deemed to conﬂict with a Federal Rule. This raises federalism concerns, 
particularly if one believes in “resurgent dynamism at the state level” and the 




Shady Grove also implicates the constitutional separation of powers. It is 
courts that determine whether arguably substantive state law will be displaced. 
This power is normally reserved for Congress and is typically exercised by the 
courts only in areas where Congress has already exercised its enumerated law-
making powers (e.g., in interpreting the preemptive effect of congressional stat-
utes).
9
 Although Federal Rules have the force of law, it is dubious whether courts 
 
5. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 398, 409-10; Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965); Sibbach v. 
Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (“The test must be whether a rule really regulates proce-
dure . . . .”). Erie questions do not divide the Court along the typical lines. In Shady Grove, 
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and 
Justice Sotomayor; Justice Ginsburg’s dissent was joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and 
Alito. It is thus hard to predict how the Court’s new members would address an Erie conﬂicts 
case methodologically. See Steinman, supra note 2, at 1178. 
6. See Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a Conﬂicts Perspective Can Aid the Analysis, 
74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235, 1252 (1999) (noting the “[v]irtually irrebuttable presump-
tions . . . in favor of application of a Federal Rule in preference to a conﬂicting state procedural 
rule” once a conﬂict is determined to exist). 
7. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 419-20 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment); id. at 443 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive 
Rights” (in the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 68-69 (1998). 
8. Ernest A. Young, A General Defense of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 
17, 20 (2013). But cf. Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 1998-99 
(2014) (arguing that today, federalism primarily inheres in congressional statutes providing a 
role for states). If Gluck is right, we should be doubly concerned about an interpretation of 
Erie that facilitates further federal intrusion into the realm of state authority, especially one 
with fewer political safeguards and opportunities for state contestation. 
9. See Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1639, 1659 
(2008) (“To the extent that such judicial lawmaking can be justiﬁed, it must be through either 
delegation by Congress or through ‘constitutional preemption of state law that unduly im-
pairs federal functions.’” (quoting Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of 
Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1453 (2001))). Under Erie, federal common lawmaking has 
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interpreting them ought to be able to exercise the full scope of federal power to 
displace state law, because such Rules do not go through the full legislative pro-
cess of bicameralism and presentment.
10
 
As Ralph Whitten wrote after Shady Grove, 
Combined with its failure to establish an appropriate and consistent 
method for interpreting Federal Rules to determine whether they conﬂict 
with state law, the Court leaves the fundamental, threshold question un-
der the Erie doctrine in a state of incoherence. The result has and will 
continue to be chaos in the lower federal courts.
11
 
Whitten’s prediction proved correct. The Court’s confused Erie doctrine has 
led to ongoing or emerging circuit splits in several areas, including (1) whether 
state laws creating special motions to dismiss for strategic lawsuits against public 
participation (SLAPPs)
12
 conﬂict with Rule 12’s motion to dismiss provisions;
13
 
(2) whether discovery-staying provisions in anti-SLAPP laws conﬂict with Rule 
56’s discovery rules;
14
 (3) whether state laws requiring certain sworn statements 
 
also been interpreted to be permitted in areas of exclusively federal authority including inter-
state disputes and admiralty law, but these areas are less relevant to state interests and law. See 
Bradford R. Clark, Erie’s Constitutional Source, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1289, 1309 n.141 (2007) [here-
inafter Clark, Erie’s Constitutional Source] (arguing that these enclaves of federal authority do 
not constitute a true federal common law). 
10. See infra Section III.B.1. 
11. Ralph U. Whitten, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.: Justice 
Whitten, Nagging in Part and Declaring a Pox on All Houses, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 115, 125 
(2010). 
12. According to John Lynch, SLAPPs are lawsuits ﬁled in response to unwanted speech or advo-
cacy that are “intended not so much to win in court as to discourage advocacy disagreeable to 
the plaintiff through the prospect of ruinously expensive litigation,” thereby burdening de-
fendants’ free speech. John A. Lynch, Jr., Federal Procedure and Erie: Saving State Litigation 
Reform Through Comparative Impairment, 30 WHITTIER L. REV. 283, 317 (2008). Anti-SLAPP 
laws provide special motions to dismiss in such cases, requiring plaintiffs to justify the merits 
of their potentially speech-inhibiting lawsuits before forcing defendants to incur these ex-
penses. 
13. Compare Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 86-91 (1st Cir. 2010) (ﬁnding no conﬂict), and 
United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 
1999) (ﬁnding no conﬂict), with Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1333-36 
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (ﬁnding a conﬂict with Rule 12), and Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 
254, 274 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (ﬁnding a conﬂict with Rule 12). See gen-
erally Tyler J. Kimberly, Note, A SLAPP Back on Track: How Shady Grove Prevents the Applica-
tion of Anti-SLAPP Laws in Federal Courts, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1201 (2015) (explaining 
anti-SLAPP statutes and describing federal courts’ approach to dealing with them). 
14. Compare Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 846 (9th Cir. 2001) (ﬁnding a conﬂict 
with Rule 56), with Godin, 629 F.3d at 90-91 (ﬁnding no conﬂict). 
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beyond the ﬁling requirements of Rule 11 conﬂict with that Rule;
15
 and (4) 
whether state laws barring requests for punitive damages without court permis-
sion conﬂict with Rule 8(a)(3)’s requirement that complaints contain a demand 
for relief.
16
 Each of these splits has been driven, at least in part, by the application 
of inconsistent Erie conﬂicts methodologies, varying from plain textual interpre-
tation to outright conﬂicts avoidance. 
Responding to this confusion over methodology, Allan Erbsen has called for 
the development of “a default rule—which one might label an ‘Erie canon’—to 
determine whether federal statutes and rules should be interpreted broadly or 
narrowly to embrace or avoid conﬂict with otherwise applicable state laws.”
17
 
Erbsen argues that such a default rule would beneﬁt Erie jurisprudence by im-
proving judicial economy, reducing arbitrariness in decision-making, providing 
better ex ante guidance to rule drafters, and linking rule interpretation to broader 
normative commitments.
18
 But he stops short of proposing a speciﬁc default 
rule. 
In this Note, I offer just that: a federalism-based avoidance canon for Erie 
conﬂicts. This canon ﬁlls the interpretive gap left by Shady Grove. I argue that 
courts facing a potential conﬂict between a Federal Rule and a state law should 
ﬁrst ask whether there is a reading of the Federal Rule that can be plausibly sup-
ported by the Rule’s text and Advisory Committee Notes that does not conﬂict 
with the state law in question.
19
 If the answer is “yes,” the court should default 
 
15. Compare Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 263 (3d Cir. 2011) (ﬁnding no 
conﬂict), and Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523, 1540 (10th Cir. 
1996) (ﬁnding no conﬂict), with Royalty Network, Inc. v. Harris, 756 F.3d 1351, 1359-60 (11th 
Cir. 2014) (ﬁnding a conﬂict with Rule 11). 
16. Compare Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 184 F.3d 1292, 1297-99 (11th Cir. 1999) (ﬁnding a con-
ﬂict with Rule 8), vacated in part on other grounds, 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000), with Allen v. 
Woodford, No. 1:05-CV-01104-OWW-LJO, 2006 WL 1748587, at *21 (E.D. Cal. June 26, 
2006) (ﬁnding no conﬂict), Jones v. Krautheim, 208 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1178 (D. Colo. 2002) 
(ﬁnding no conﬂict), and Nereson v. Zurich Ins. Co., No. Civ. A3-91-72, 1992 WL 212233, at 
*1 (D.N.D. Aug. 20, 1992) (ﬁnding no conﬂict). 
17. Erbsen, supra note 3, at 125. According to Erbsen, a default rule is “a starting point for judicial 
implementation of a potentially difficult inquiry” that establishes a default outcome for a par-
ticular species of legal question. Id. at 130. Erbsen speciﬁcally notes that defaults and “canons” 
can be used interchangeably. See id. at 147. 
18. See id. at 147 n.92. 
19. For a full explanation of the rulemaking process, see Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Del-
egation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1103-04 (2002). 
Brieﬂy, the current rulemaking process for Federal Rules of Civil Procedure entails (at least) 
seven steps. First, proposed rules or amendments are reported to the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules. At its next biannual meeting, the Advisory Committee votes to accept, reject, or 
defer the Reporter’s proposed change. If the Committee accepts a proposal, the Reporter then 
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to that reading without analysis of the Rule or state law’s substantive purposes, 
thereby avoiding the conﬂict and the displacement of state law. If the answer is 
“no,” the court should apply the Federal Rule, per Hanna, so long as it is valid 
under the REA. This approach would resolve the troublesome lacuna in the 
Court’s current Erie jurisprudence, reducing the risk of future inconsistencies 
and circuit splits. It would also pay greater respect to important state interests 
by more often giving them effect in federal court. Finally, it would protect the 
separation of powers by limiting judicial power to displace state law. 
This approach is somewhat radical in that it purports to rationalize a funda-
mentally ad hoc, functionalist doctrine with a formalist rule. Despite the diffi-
culties it has created, one beneﬁt of the Court’s existing Erie conﬂicts methodol-
ogy (or lack thereof) is the ﬂexibility it affords courts to make discretionary 
judgments about the relative importance of the federal and state interests at 
play.
20
 Nevertheless, I believe that a federalism-based avoidance canon for Erie 
conﬂicts will achieve these objectives better than an ad hoc interest-balancing 
approach, given the Court’s past decisions and the institutional constraints in-
volved. 
What, then, would the new equilibrium for Erie cases look like under this 
canon? The canon’s principal effect would be far more consistent adjudication 
of Erie conﬂicts cases. This canon is intentionally triggered by a “plausible” non-
conﬂicting reading of a Federal Rule in order to set the bar low enough to avoid 
 
prepares a draft rule or amendment and a proposed Note to accompany it. If the Committee 
accepts the language of the Rule or amendment and Note, the Committee then requests per-
mission from the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure to publish the pro-
posal. If permission is granted, the Committee circulates the proposal in accordance with the 
1988 amendments to the Rules Enabling Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (2018). After the appropriate 
comment period, the Committee either approves and submits the proposal to the Standing 
Committee or revises it and provides additional opportunity for public comment (or decides 
not to move forward). Once the proposal is sent on, the Standing Committee then either 
approves the proposal as it is and sends it to the Judicial Conference; revises the proposal and 
sends it to the Judicial Conference; revises the proposal and sends it back to the Advisory 
Committee for additional public comment; or rejects it. Once the proposal is sent to the Ju-
dicial Conference, the Conference then determines whether to approve and send it to the Su-
preme Court. If they choose to do so, the Supreme Court then decides whether to approve. If 
the Court does approve, the Chief Justice must submit the proposal (including the Rule text 
and Note) to Congress by May 1 of the year in which the Rule or amendment is to take effect. 
Congress then has until December 1 to veto the proposal; otherwise, the Rule or amendment 
goes into effect on December 1. 
20. The desire for ﬂexible adjudication has long motivated opponents of more formalist ap-
proaches to Erie. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITU-
TION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA 218-20 (2000). 
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debate over the relative superiority of potential interpretations.
21
 Judges have 
been known to differ in their assessments of statutory ambiguity.
22
 Setting the 
bar at plausibility should, in theory, make it easier for those who ﬁnd at least 
reasonable nonconﬂicting interpretations to convince others to join them.
23
 
The canon’s second-order effects are more conceptually interesting, if less 
immediately clear. There are two possible directional equilibria and a ﬂuid mid-
dle ground between them. One option is that this canon will result in far greater 
application of state law in federal court. If the canon is faithfully applied and 
Rules interpreted narrowly are not amended to facially preempt state law, then 
relevant state law provisions will apply in diversity actions and their substantive 
goals will be given effect. From a federalism perspective, this outcome is desira-
ble. 
At the other end of the spectrum, it is possible that the Court, Rules com-
mittees, or Congress could undertake to amend narrowly interpreted rules to 
give them clearer preemptive effect. While this would undermine the canon’s 
pure federalism objective, it would still be preferable to the current system on 
separation of powers grounds. It would still avoid some of the circuit splits and 
inconsistency wrought by the Court’s present approach and would at least chan-
nel preemption through Congress and the formal procedures of the REA. 
Preemption is a blunt instrument, eviscerating state authority where applied, but 
one that Congress has the power to use when it acts pursuant to one of its enu-
merated powers.
24
 Because Congress can displace state law in the face of weighty 
 
21. As Erbsen notes, using the proper standard for triggering any Erie conﬂicts canon is critical 
for its success. See Erbsen, supra note 3, at 150. 
22. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., STATUTES, REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION: LEGIS-
LATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 520 (2014). 
23. Here, I use “plausibility” to mean minimal interpretive reasonableness. As the Court noted in 
Jean v. Nelson, avoidance canons permit second-best interpretations up to the point that they 
become “disingenuous evasion” of the text. 472 U.S. 846, 854 (1985) (quoting United States 
v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96 (1985)). This meaning of plausibility is distinct from its use in Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, where plausibility was contrasted with mere conceivability (i.e., the 
condition of being minimally reasonable or possible, a standard more akin to the one I adopt 
here). 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009) (applying 
the Twombly standard and its distinction between conceivable and plausible). Despite the po-
tential confusion regarding the dual uses of “plausibility” in statutory interpretation and 
pleading contexts, I use the term “plausibility” because of its ubiquity in the avoidance canon 
literature. See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 
109, 118 (2010); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 
1025 (1994); Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997). Of course, 
the use of any standard for ambiguity still depends on agreement that there is ambiguity in 
the ﬁrst place. See infra Section III.C.5. 
24. See Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 732 (2008). 
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federal interests, the Court should not do so when Congress has chosen to re-
main silent, particularly given the absence of political safeguards for federalism 
when the Court displaces state law.
25
 Process matters, normatively and constitu-
tionally, even when the outcome is the same.
26
 
Finally, these institutions could split the difference. The Court and commit-
tees might choose to amend Rules for preemptive effect only when some im-
portant federal interest is at issue. This outcome would likewise be normatively 
desirable for the reasons explained above. The real question is where on this 
spectrum we would end up. The record suggests some version of the ﬁrst out-
come is most likely. Five Supreme Court cases have interpreted Federal Rules 
narrowly to avoid conﬂict with state law—Rule 8 under Palmer v. Hoffman,
27
 
Rule 23 under Cohen v. Beneﬁcial Industrial Loan Corp.,
28
 Rule 3 under Walker v. 
Armco Steel Corp.,
29
 Rule 59 under Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,
30
 and 
Rule 41 under Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
31
—and all of the 
Federal Rules at issue retain the meaning given to them in those cases.
32
 Subse-




25. To be sure, Congress nearly always rubber-stamps amendments to the Rules via inaction, 
which may undermine the strength of my process-federalism argument in practice. See Martin 
H. Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the Procedural-Substantive Tension: 
A Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 26, 93-94 (2008). Still, process federalism 
is served by respecting the boundaries of the REA’s delegation as a formal matter and by 
channeling contestation over these issues in practice into a forum with far greater state repre-
sentation. Moreover, congressional overrides of Federal Rules that encroach on state authority 
are not unheard of, even if they are uncommon. See Young, supra note 8, at 75 (discussing the 
congressional override of proposed Federal Rules of Evidence “abrogating state laws”) (quot-
ing Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie—The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 
1685 (1974)). 
26. See Young, supra note 8, at 115 (“By insisting that federal courts may not make federal law 
outside the constitutionally ordained legislative process, Erie became the central decision of 
modern process federalism.”); Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presump-
tion Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 280 [hereinafter Young, 
Ordinary Diet] (“[S]hifting preemptive authority away from Congress to judicial or executive 
institutions that do not represent the states and that can promulgate federal norms more easily 
than Congress amounts to a signiﬁcant threat to state autonomy.”). 
27. 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943). 
28. 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949). 
29. 446 U.S. 740, 750 (1980). 
30. 518 U.S. 415, 417 (1996). 
31. 531 U.S. 497, 507-09 (2001). 
32. See infra Section I.A. 
33. See FED. R. CIV. P. 3, 8, 23, 41, & 59 advisory committee’s notes. 
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course, it is possible that the advent of an explicit avoidance canon would galva-
nize overriding amendments in a way ad hoc avoidance has not. For now, 
though, it seems safe to assume that at least some narrow readings adopted un-
der this canon would stand. 
The remainder of this Note is organized as follows: Part I surveys the Court’s 
prior cases involving potential conﬂicts between Federal Rules and state laws, 
including an explanation of the three divergent approaches of Shady Grove. Part 
II summarizes the literature on values-based statutory interpretation and avoid-
ance, and the role each should play in resolving Erie conﬂicts. Part III presents 
the argument for my proposed conﬂicts avoidance canon and evaluates the canon 
in light of counterarguments and alternative methodologies. Finally, Part IV 
demonstrates how my canon would operate in practice. 
i .  conflict over conflicts in erie questions 
The Shady Grove decision represented the culmination of a seventy-year line 
of confusing and contradictory approaches to conﬂicts analysis in Erie cases.
34
 In 
the wake of Sibbach’s rigid interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act, any state 
law in ostensible conﬂict with a Federal Rule that “really regulates procedure” 
was destined for the dustbin in federal court.
35
 In Sibbach, the Court held that 
Rule 35’s provisions for court-ordered medical examinations were valid under 
the Rules Enabling Act because they “really regulate[d] procedure[]—the judi-
cial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law.”
36
 
This left the Court—still operating in the shadow of Erie’s federalism concerns—
with the unenviable task of faithfully applying its holding in Sibbach without 
eviscerating the application of state law in diversity cases.
37
 Using Erie conﬂicts 
analysis to avoid unnecessary clashes between the Federal Rules and state law 
would have been a natural way of pursuing this objective. Unfortunately, the 
 
34. See Thomas, supra note 4, at 197-210. 
35. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941); see John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 
87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 719 (1974). 
36. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14. Although Sibbach did not involve a conﬂict with state law, it nonethe-
less established a standard for rule validity that would bear on this question in later cases. 
37. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“Except in matters governed by the 
Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the 
State. And whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by 
its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern.”); Stephen B. Burbank & 
Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 17, 25-26 (2010) (noting the “incentive for restrained interpretation” of the Federal Rules 
after Sibbach to avoid overstepping the boundaries of federal lawmaking authority). 
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Court never developed a standard doctrinal framework for doing so, using sev-
eral competing—and often conﬂicting—methodologies over time. This scatter-
shot approach eventually culminated in Shady Grove’s three conﬂicting tests.
38
 
A. The History of Conﬂicts and Avoidance in Erie Cases 
1. The Early Cases: Avoidance Ascendant 
Just two years after its decision in Sibbach, the Court confronted the question 
of how to assess the scope of a Federal Rule and its potential conﬂict with state 
law over the burden of proof for contributory negligence defenses.
39
 In Palmer v. 
Hoffman, the Court adopted a narrow reading of Rule 8’s provisions for pleading 
affirmative defenses, holding that the Rule spoke only to the manner of pleading 
its listed defenses rather than to which party held the burden of proof.
40
 In so 
holding, the Court gave effect to a Massachusetts law allocating the burden of 
proof to the plaintiffs.
41
 Although the Court did not make explicit its motivation 
to preserve the application of local law, Palmer nonetheless represents its ﬁrst use 
of statutory interpretation to avoid conﬂict between a Federal Rule and state law, 
thereby preserving the application of both in federal court.
42
 
Similarly, in Cohen v. Beneﬁcial Industrial Loan Corp., the Court held that Fed-
eral Rule 23, which at the time governed pleading requirements in shareholder-
derivative actions, did not preempt a New Jersey law requiring the plaintiff to 
post a bond, contrary to the Federal Rule.
43
 The Court was clear that it intended 
to protect the state policy embodied in this procedural rule, stating that “this 
statute is not merely a regulation of procedure . . . it creates a new liability where 
 
38. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Real Risk of Forum Shopping: A Dissent from Shady Grove, 44 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 34 (2010) (pointing to the Court’s lack of “a coherent theory of when 
federal and state rules collide”); Burbank & Wolff, supra note 37, at 37 (“[T]he Justices have 
lurched from one extreme to the other.”); Thomas, supra note 4, at 190 (describing the Court’s 
efforts to develop a coherent conﬂicts framework as being in a “state of abject disarray”). 
39. See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943). 
40. See id. 
41. See id. at 117-18. 
42. See Thomas, supra note 4, at 201 (arguing that Palmer is an example of conﬂict avoidance). 
43. 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949). 




 Palmer and Cohen were thus part of a larger pattern of 
decisions in the mid-twentieth century that construed Federal Rules narrowly.
45
 
These decisions were the forerunners to Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,
46
 argu-
ably the archetypal Erie avoidance case. In Walker, the Court took a narrow view 
of Rule 3’s provisions for commencing a civil action in federal court, allowing 
Oklahoma’s state law governing the tolling of statutes of limitations based on 
service—rather than commencement—to coexist alongside the Federal Rule.
47
 
Walker for the ﬁrst time articulated a two-step approach to applying the Erie 
doctrine to a Federal Rule: “The ﬁrst question must . . . be whether the scope of 
the Federal Rule in fact is sufficiently broad to control the issue before the Court. 




Although Walker represents a clear instance of conﬂict avoidance, its dicta on 
avoidance and conﬂicts methodology has caused ongoing confusion.
49
 First, Jus-
tice Marshall arguably undercut the Court’s avoidance rationale when in a foot-
note he offered a caveat to Walker’s result: “This is not to suggest that the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure are to be narrowly construed in order to avoid a ‘direct 
collision’ with state law. The Federal Rules should be given their plain mean-
ing.”
50
 This both undermined the main thrust of the opinion and dodged the 
trickier question of what to do when plain meaning can support more than one 
construction. Walker’s duplicity on the question of conﬂicts analysis left the 
Court with an implicit avoidance approach in its result and an explicit warning 
 
44. Id. at 555. Joseph Bauer offers additional detail on the policy motivations underlying New 
Jersey’s statute and the Court’s reasoning. See Joseph P. Bauer, Shedding Light on Shady Grove: 
Reﬂections on the Erie Doctrine from a Conﬂicts Perspective, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 939, 975 
(2011). Some commentators liken Cohen to Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 
U.S. 530 (1949), in discussing Erie avoidance, see, e.g., Bauer, supra note 6, at 1252 n.75, but 
this grouping is misplaced. Ragan was decided by classifying the relevant state law as sub-
stantive under Guaranty Trust v. York’s outcome determination test, thus mandating its appli-
cation in federal court, not by narrowing the scope of Federal Rule 3 to avoid a conﬂict. 337 
U.S. at 533-34. 
45. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1032 (1982). 
46. 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
47. See id. at 750-52. 
48. See id. at 749-50. 
49. Federal courts had long been applying Rule 3 for tolling purposes in nondiversity cases, sug-
gesting a plausible alternative reading. See Mark N. Parry, Commencement Rules and Tolling 
Statutes of Limitations in Federal Court: Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 66 CORNELL L. REV. 842, 
854-55 (1981). 
50. Walker, 446 U.S. at 750 n.9. 
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against avoidance in its dicta. This confusion presaged the Erie conﬂicts ping-
pong to come. 
Second, Justice Marshall conducted the conﬂicts analysis in Walker by look-
ing to the substantive intent of the state law and Federal Rule at issue, blurring 
the lines between his two-step approach.
51
 It is logically tenuous to acknowledge 
the substantive aims of a Federal Rule before summarily labeling the Rule proce-
dural under Hanna (which the Court has never failed to do once it reaches the 
second step).
52
 There are clear functionalist advantages to Justice Marshall’s ap-
proach, in that it allows judges to tailor their readings of the relevant Rule and 
state law to the substantive policy goals at hand. But the idea of acknowledging 
substantive content at the conﬂicts stage while maintaining the facade of “pro-
cedurality” at the validity stage is conceptually problematic, to say the least. It 
reﬂects the mental gymnastics the Court has undertaken to accommodate state 
interests while avoiding the invalidation of any Federal Rules. This is not to say 
that substance and procedure can be neatly separated (they cannot), only that 
making no formal attempt to separate them undermines the independent role of 
the second step of the Walker analysis. There is a better way to account for state 
interests while maintaining the logical integrity of the Hanna-Sibbach test, as I 
argue below. 
2. Hanna and its Progeny: State Law in Retreat 
The early avoidance cases naturally alarmed those who viewed the Rules En-
abling Act as the path toward uniformity of federal procedure.
53
 These fears were 
eventually assuaged by the Court’s broad application of the Federal Rules in 
Hanna v. Plumer.
54
 In Hanna, the Court held that Rule 4’s provision for service 
of process “really regulates procedure,” and thus displaces applicable state ser-
vice law.
55
 On the subject of conﬂicts, the Hanna Court explicitly construed ear-
lier cases, such as Palmer and Cohen, to have turned on the scope of Rules insuf-
 
51. See id. at 750-52, 750 n.10. 
52. See infra Section I.B.2. This logical duplicity was not dispositive in Walker because the Court 
determined there was no conﬂict (and thus no need to rule on the validity of the Rule), but 
its specter has haunted Erie conﬂicts cases since. 
53. Id.; see also Burbank & Wolff, supra note 37, at 31 (explaining that Ragan and other early avoid-
ance cases “seemed to threaten the integrity of the Federal Rules”). 
54. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
55. Id. at 464. 
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Hanna was notable for its reaffirmation and broadening of Sibbach to hold 
that where Rules are “rationally capable” of being classiﬁed as either substantive 
or procedural, they fall within the valid scope of the REA.
57
 As John Hart Ely 
later wrote, Hanna gave us “a singularly hard-hearted rendition [of Erie]: any 
federal rule (or at least any Federal Rule) that is even arguably procedural is to 
be applied in a diversity action, state law to the contrary notwithstanding.”
58
 
Hanna could have ended the debate over Erie conﬂicts by creating an unwa-
vering presumption in favor of the Federal Rules, but it did not. Instead, by say-
ing little about the practical mechanics of evaluating Erie conﬂicts, it gave the 
Court the ammunition it needed to disregard state laws that did not resonate 
with the Justices. At the same time, it left in place the ability to construe Federal 
Rules narrowly when state interests deemed sufficiently meritorious (or “sub-
stantive”) were to be protected. Despite its long recitation of precedent, Hanna’s 
case-speciﬁc conﬂicts analysis is somewhat cursory, conﬁned mostly to a one-
sentence parenthetical.
59
 Taken at face value, though, it implies the principle that 
when the Federal Rules set a procedural bar (e.g., service by home delivery), 
state law may not impose a higher bar (e.g., in-hand service) in the federal 
courts. The Federal Rule functions as a ceiling, not a ﬂoor. 
Hanna’s conﬂicts analysis took no position on other possible forms of Rule 
ambiguity, including cases where the establishment of one explicit procedural 
bar may or may not establish a second implicit bar on a related issue (e.g., com-
mencement versus tolling in Walker) or cases where the enumeration of a set of 
procedures may or may not be construed as exhaustive (e.g., the creation of spe-
cial motions to dismiss in addition to those listed in Rule 12). 
The Court’s next two Erie conﬂicts cases after Walker—Burlington Northern 
Railroad Co. v. Woods
60
 and Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.
61
 —saw a 
Federal Rule and a federal statute read broadly to displace state law where coex-
istence was at least plausible. In each case, a federal rule or statute providing for 
judicial discretion (over penalties in Burlington Northern and venue transfer in 
 
56. Id. at 470. 
57. Id. at 472. 
58. Ely, supra note 35, at 697 (footnote omitted). 
59. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470. 
60. 480 U.S. 1 (1987). 
61. 487 U.S. 22 (1988). 
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Stewart) was deemed to conﬂict with a state law mandating a particular out-
come.
62
 According to these cases, when state law eliminates some subset of dis-
cretionary outcomes allowable under federal law, the state law cannot apply.
63
 
3. Resurgent State Law and Avoidance 
After Burlington Northern and Stewart, the Court lurched back in the other 
direction. In Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., a majority led by Justice 
Ginsburg managed to reconcile Rule 59(a)—allowing district judges to grant a 
new trial “for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been 
granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States”
64
—with a New York 
law requiring judges to grant a new trial if a jury award “deviates materially” 
from reasonable expected compensation.
65
 Since Walker, Gasperini represents 
the high-water mark for Erie avoidance applied at the conﬂicts analysis stage. 
Justice Ginsburg took an interest-based avoidance approach, noting that de-
spite Hanna’s holding, “[f]ederal courts have interpreted the Federal 
Rules . . . with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies.”
66
 
Under her methodology, “[t]he dispositive question . . . is whether federal 
courts can give effect to the substantive thrust of [the state law at issue] without 
 
62. See Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 7; see also Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30 (“[W]here federal law’s 
‘discretionary mode of operation’ conﬂicts with the nondiscretionary provision of Alabama 
law, federal law applies in diversity.” (quoting Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 7)). 
63. Burlington Northern and Stewart also pose the second-order question of whether the process 
of evaluating the plausible plain textual meaning for conﬂicts purposes should be augmented 
by additional sub-rules for Rule construction. My answer is yes. Augmentation by sub-rules 
should be encouraged, provided these rules are made explicit. Sub-rules provide clearer ex 
ante drafting instructions to rule writers, help to avoid ambiguity, and minimize inconsistency 
in adjudication. Although I take no position here on the merits of different possible sub-rules 
of construction, it is worth noting that the development of such rules could provide a channel 
through which to protect federal or state substantive interests. By matching the direction of 
default for various sub-rules (pro- or no-conﬂict defaults) to the normative preference for 
privileging state or federal interests, those substantive interests could be protected even under 
a more formalist regime. 
64. 518 U.S. 415, 417 (1996) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)). 
65. Id. at 437. The larger question in Gasperini was whether the Seventh Amendment’s Reexami-
nation Clause precludes review of jury verdicts in federal court, with the Court ultimately 
holding that it precludes federal appellate review of the jury award for more than “abuse of 
discretion” but allows review of jury verdicts for material deviation (the New York standard) 
by federal trial courts. See id. at 432-36. The Erie conﬂicts question was whether, at the trial 
court level, Rule 59 preempts state law providing a speciﬁc standard of review for new trial 
motions. See id. at 437 n.22. 
66. Id. at 427 n.7. 
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untoward alteration of the federal scheme for the trial and decision of civil 
cases.”
67
 By construing Rule 59(a) not to preclude a state-law standard for new 
trial motions, Justice Ginsburg avoided the conﬂict and made room for the ap-
plication of state law.
68
 
In Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., the Court’s ﬁnal pro-
nouncement on Erie conﬂicts before Shady Grove, the Court held that an invol-
untary dismissal in federal court under Rule 41(b) was not claim-preclusive in 
state courts.
69
 That is, Rule 41 did not preempt state law governing claim viabil-
ity. The Court’s decision was driven by a desire not to “violate the federalism 
principle of Erie R[ailroad] Co. v. Tompkins . . . by engendering substantial vari-
ations [in outcomes] between state and federal litigation” and to avoid an “ar-
guable violation of the [Rules Enabling] Act.”
70
 To achieve these objectives, 
however, required interpretive somersaults that cut against Walker’s “plain 
meaning” directive
71
 and suggested an approach radically different from that of 
Burlington Northern and Stewart. The opinion’s strained reasoning—which Ste-
ven Burbank and Tobias Wolff have quipped “can only charitably be described 
as interpretation and only in Wonderland as an exercise in ‘plain meaning’ in-
terpretation”—likely reﬂects the Court’s desire to avoid opening the Pandora’s 
Box of invalidating a Federal Rule.
72
 The Court’s interpretation strikes many 




67. Id. at 426. 
68. See id. at 437 n.22; Steinman, supra note 2, at 1146-49 (explaining that Rule 59 lacked the depth 
to displace state law because the Rule itself did not provide the federal standard that was po-
tentially in conﬂict with state law). 
69. 531 U.S. 497, 507-09 (2001). The case involved a complicated set of contract and tort claims 
under California law, which were ultimately dismissed in federal court under California’s stat-
ute of limitations, and a simultaneous Maryland state court claim which was timely under 
Maryland’s statute of limitations but dismissed due to the res judicata effect of the federal 
court judgment on the California claims under Rule 41. Semtek’s appeal sought to overturn 
the claim-preclusive effect of the federal judgment in Maryland state court. See id. at 499-500. 
70. Id. at 504, 506 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
71. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980). 
72. See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 37, at 40. True policing of the boundaries of the Rules Ena-
bling Act would open the door to a variety of thorny interpretive questions and require the 
Court to (at least attempt to) address the distinction between substance and procedure osten-
sibly at issue in the Act’s second clause. The Court has implied that it is loath to do so. See 
Struve, supra note 19, at 1147 (observing “[t]he Court’s notorious failure to police the Act’s 
prohibition on Rules affecting substantive rights”). 
73. See Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum Shopping, and Federal Common Law, 77 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1027, 1041-42 (2002). 
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B. Erie Conﬂicts Today: The Shady Grove Problem 
All this confusion set up the Court for an inevitable clash over Erie conﬂicts 
in Shady Grove. Asked whether a New York law prohibiting penalty damages in 
class actions could be given effect in federal court in light of Rule 23, the Court 
took three distinct approaches. In this Section, I analyze these approaches and 
the role that conﬂicts analysis played in this divergence. 
1. The Lessons of Shady Grove 
Shady Grove arose out of a class action suit brought by Shady Grove Ortho-
pedic Associates to recover unpaid interest owed to them by Allstate on an over-
due insurance claim. The interest was owed under a New York statute applicable 
to an insurance policy issued by Allstate in New York. At issue was whether a 
New York law precluding class action suits to recover a statutory “penalty” was 
displaced by Rule 23’s requirements for federal class actions.
74
 The Court held 
that it was, but the Justices’ votes and reasoning were fractured. A four-justice 
plurality concluded that Rule 23 fully governed the issue and thus displaced the 
state law; a concurrence by Justice Stevens emphasized the absence of substan-
tive relation to state rights and remedies in the New York law; and a four-justice 
dissent argued that Rule 23 was not sufficiently broad to govern the availability 
of remedies in class actions (i.e., there was no conﬂict). 
For our purposes, the three opinions in Shady Grove may be best understood 
through their divergent takes on conﬂicts analysis and on the extent of separa-
tion between the conﬂicts and REA stages of analysis.
75
 Justice Scalia took a 
strictly formalist approach, affirming the two-step ordering and focusing nar-
rowly on the Rule’s text.
76
 Justice Scalia’s opinion also evinced an awareness of 
the stakes of the conﬂicts analysis for the fate of state law: if the Rule “answers 
the question in dispute . . . it governs—New York’s law notwithstanding—un-




74. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 397 (2010). 
75. Of course, some of the differences between Justice Scalia’s approach to Erie conﬂicts and that 
of Justices Stevens and Ginsburg reﬂect their broader textualist and purposivist approaches 
to statutory interpretation, respectively. Although I do not dwell on these underlying motiva-
tions and instead focus on their stated approaches to this narrower issue, such concerns no 
doubt inform the Court’s interpretive approach. My proposal seeks to draw on both sets of 
opinions, employing an interpretive methodology more akin to Justice Scalia’s in the service 
of the normative goals that motivated Justices Stevens and Ginsburg. 
76. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 398. 
77. Id. 
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dispositive question for Justice Scalia was whether the Federal Rule and state law 
purport to “answer the same question.”
78
 If they did, the Federal Rule would 
govern so long as it really regulates procedure, per Hanna and Sibbach. 
And yet, despite his previous efforts to avoid encroaching upon state inter-
ests in Semtek, Justice Scalia was evidently willing to do so in Shady Grove. Rely-
ing on “the statute’s clear text” and dismissing the (at least plausible) interpre-
tations of the Rule taken by the Second Circuit and the dissent, Justice Scalia 




Commentators have lodged a variety of criticisms of Justice Scalia’s plurality 
opinion.
80
 It embodies many of the problems with previous Erie conﬂicts juris-
prudence that led us to this point in the ﬁrst place. To begin, it lacks any formal 
canon or doctrine to constrain the interpretive preferences of the particular court 
reviewing each case (here, plain textual interpretation). This is a particular prob-
lem in Erie cases, where uniformity is among the key interests at stake. Justice 
Scalia’s ability to interpret the text of vexing statutes and rules aside, we should 
be wary of leaving Erie conﬂicts questions to the unguided instincts of individual 
courts. The Supreme Court’s—let alone lower courts’—track record in such cases 
leaves much to be desired in terms of consistency and respect for federalism.
81
 
Combined with its strict application of the Hanna-Sibbach test, this unguided 
interpretive approach is part of the reason that Erie jurisprudence is so fractured 
and that state substantive law has so often yielded to the Federal Rules when it 
need not have. 
Justice Stevens’s concurrence similarly laid out the Walker ordering of con-
ﬂicts and REA analysis as components of a “two-step framework” but then pro-
ceeded to conduct the steps largely contemporaneously.
82
 His approach is worth 
examining in detail for its ambitious articulation of why avoidance of Erie con-
ﬂicts is desirable and its deep attentiveness to federalism and the separation of 
 
78. See id. at 399. 
79. Id. at 402. Justice Scalia’s analysis of the text of Rule 23 was terse, quickly determining the 
Rule’s plain textual meaning and then dismissing counterarguments in turn. “By its 
terms . . . Rule 23 provides a one-size-ﬁts-all formula for deciding the class-action question.” 
Id. at 398-99. 
80. See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 44, at 957-69 (critiquing the plurality opinion for failing to follow 
its rhetoric of restraint by deferring to the purposes of state procedural laws to avoid con-
ﬂicts); Burbank & Wolff, supra note 37, at 64-65 (critiquing Justice Scalia’s unwillingness to 
entertain the possibility of a more limited scope for Rule 23 or evaluate its effects on state 
substantive rights). 
81. See supra Section I.A. 
82. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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powers. Justice Stevens differed from Justice Scalia on two counts: the interpre-
tation of the REA’s second clause and the value of avoidance in such cases. First, 
Justice Stevens thought that “an application of a Federal Rule that effectively 
abridges, enlarges, or modiﬁes a state-created right or remedy violates” the REA, 
even if the Rule is arguably procedural under Hanna and Sibbach.
83
 For Justice 
Stevens, the determination of Rule validity rested on “whether the state law ac-
tually is part of a State’s framework of substantive rights or remedies” (even if it 
is facially procedural).
84
 This reading was intended to give meaning to both the 
text and original intent of the REA, an effort which faced a potential problem in 
light of Hanna and Sibbach.
85
 
For this very reason, Justice Stevens endeavored to distinguish Sibbach on 
the grounds that it did not involve a conﬂict between the Federal Rules and state 
law, contesting the application of its holding in conﬂicts cases.
86
 Instead of as-
sessing conﬂict and then applying the Hanna-Sibbach test, Justice Stevens sub-
stituted his own Erie “two-step” analysis. First, he would assess the scope of the 
Federal Rule based on the substantive purposes of the state law, interpreting the 
Federal Rule narrowly to avoid conﬂict where possible.
87
 Second, if no saving 
construction for the Federal Rule could be found, Justice Stevens would deny its 
application and allow state law to apply in federal court.
88
 
Normatively, Justice Stevens’s attempt to reinvigorate the limitations of the 
REA seems to have derived from two sources. The ﬁrst was the federalism goal 
of protecting state substantive policy choices, whether embodied in facially sub-
stantive or facially procedural laws.
89
 The second was to safeguard the separation 
 
83. Id. at 422. 
84. Id. at 419. 
85. See Burbank, supra note 45, at 1185-91. Justice Scalia nearly admitted as much, writing of Ste-
vens’s view that “[t]here is something to that” but ultimately concluding that “Sibbach has 
been settled law, however, for nearly seven decades.” Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 412-13. 
86. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 427-28 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
87. See id. at 422-23 (“When a federal rule appears to abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive 
right, federal courts must consider whether the rule can reasonably be interpreted to avoid 
that impermissible result.”). 
88. Id. at 423. Whether the second step is truly a separate step or a consequence of the ﬁrst is 
debatable, but not material to the analysis here. It also raises the question of the availability 
of as-applied challenges in REA cases, left open by Justice Stevens’s divergence from the plu-
rality on that matter. See generally Catherine T. Struve, Institutional Practice, Procedural Uni-
formity, and As-Applied Challenges Under the Rules Enabling Act, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1181 
(2011) (favoring Justice Stevens’s approach to as-applied challenges). 
89. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 418-20 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
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of powers and limit the Court’s ability to unnecessarily displace state law. Alt-
hough “Congress may have the constitutional power to prescribe procedural 
rules that interfere with state substantive law in any number of respects, that is 
not what Congress has done.”
90
 Instead, Congress has “struck a balance” in 
which the “Enabling Act’s limitation does not mean that federal rules cannot 
displace state policy judgments; it means only that federal rules cannot displace 
a State’s deﬁnition of its own rights or remedies.”
91
 The upshot is that Justice 
Stevens recognized that the REA is at most an incomplete delegation of Con-
gress’s rulemaking power to the Court and that some zone of state substantive 
law lies beyond the Court’s delegated power. The question is how to identify 
that zone and then to police it. 
The second way in which Justice Stevens differed from Justice Scalia was his 
agreement with Justice Ginsburg’s dissent that the Court should adopt narrow 
readings of Federal Rules to avoid conﬂict with state substantive interests pro-
tected by the REA.
92
 He even went so far as to propose the equivalent of a pre-
sumption against preemption for Erie conﬂicts. As the Justice explained, even if 
Congress can displace state procedural law, “we should generally presume that 
it has not done so.”
93
 This presumption against Rule preemption was explicitly 
premised on the limits of REA delegation, which Justice Stevens noted “evinces 
the opposite intent” of a congressional purpose to preempt state law.
94
 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent was equally deferential to state interests and relied 
on similar interpretive methods to Justice Stevens’s. Her intention was “to inter-
pret Federal Rules with awareness of, and sensitivity to, important state regula-
tory policies,” pushing back against the consequences of Hanna’s holding.
95
 To 
that end, her dissent traces the Court’s long pre-Hanna history of “vigilantly 
read[ing] the Federal Rules to avoid conﬂict with state laws.”
96
 Unlike Justice 
Stevens, however, who focused primarily on the substantive purpose and func-
tion of the state law, Justice Ginsburg employed an approach that was funda-
mentally about balancing federal and state interests. “[W]e have avoided im-
moderate interpretations of the Federal Rules that would trench on state 
 
90. Id. at 417-18. 
91. Id. at 418. 
92. See id. at 430 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
93. Id. at 422 (citing the presumption against preemption as applied in Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 
555, 574-75 (2009)). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 437 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
96. Id. at 439. 
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prerogatives without serving any countervailing federal interest.”
97
 She focused less 
on the statutory boundaries of the REA than Justice Stevens did and took a more 
functionalist approach to the protection of state interests. It was essentially an 
avoidance approach to Erie conﬂicts but one that relied on substantive-interest 
balancing to execute its default presumption against conﬂict. 
My proposed canon has much in common with both Shady Grove’s concur-
rence and dissent. In Part III, I address my qualms with these approaches and 
why I believe an Erie avoidance canon can better ensure that the Federal Rules 
are “read in light of federalism concerns.”
98
 
2. Ordering Erie: Conﬂicts and REA Analysis 
Before reaching the thrust of my argument, it is important to settle two 
threshold matters: (1) the proper ordering of the conﬂicts and REA analyses in 
assessing Erie questions; and (2) the relevant focus of the substance/procedure 
analysis. The Court has been relatively consistent on the order of these questions 
since Walker (in rhetoric, if not in practice). Indeed, only Gasperini did not at 
least pay lip service to the Walker two-step.
99
 Similarly, since Hanna, the Court 
has always focused on whether the relevant Federal Rule—as opposed to the rel-
evant state law—is procedural (Justice Stevens notwithstanding). At least one 
circuit, however, has questioned both trends. This circuit either reverses the or-
der of the analysis or takes Justice Ginsburg’s substance-based approach to as-
sessing conﬂicts, discussing substance and scope together.
100
 Meanwhile, other 
lower courts have continued to follow Walker’s ordering, generating a circuit 
split that could pose challenges in future Erie cases.
101
 
The substance-then-conﬂicts ordering, as well as approaches that assess 
them contemporaneously, should be rejected for four reasons. First, it is concep-
tually questionable—not to mention difficult to square with the text and intent 
of the Rules Enabling Act—to ascribe substantive content to a Federal Rule for 
conﬂicts purposes before labeling it procedural under Hanna.
102
 And the Court 
 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 431 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see infra Section 
III.D. 
99. See supra Section I.A. 
100. See Adelson v. Harris, 774 F.3d 803, 809 (2d Cir. 2014); Liberty Synergistics Inc. v. Microﬂo 
Ltd., 718 F.3d 138, 153 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 273 
(9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring). 
101. See Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 91-92 (1st Cir. 2010); United States ex rel. Newsham v. 
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 972-73 (9th Cir. 1999). 
102. See supra Section I.A. 
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has never invalidated a Federal Rule for violating the REA’s prohibition on Rules 
that alter substantive rights.
103
  I take my canon’s logical compatibility with 
Hanna and Sibbach at the second step of Erie analysis as an advantage, especially 
without any voice on the Court pushing back against the Hanna-Sibbach test, as 
Justice Stevens had. 
One possible answer to this objection is Hanna’s observation that there exists 
“congressional power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in [fed-
eral] courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which, though 
falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally 
capable of classiﬁcation as either.”
104
 One could argue that this allows courts to 
impute substantive content to “procedural” Rules without running afoul of the 
REA. But on the Hanna Court’s own terms, this power resides with Congress, 
not the Court. That raises the question of the extent of the rulemaking delega-
tion in the REA. Where the scope of a Rule is sufficiently ambiguous to merit 
assessment of conﬂict, it creates separation-of-powers issues to assume the 
Court can exercise Congress’s full power to give a Rule expansive, substantive 
effect or to assume that Congress intended the Rule to be preemptive.
105
 Con-
gress approves most rules by inaction; “to draw any inference of tacit approval 
from nonaction by Congress is to appeal to unreality.”
106
 
Second, the substance-then-conﬂicts ordering obscures the distinction be-
tween Erie analysis where there is a federal statute or Federal Rule on point and 
where there is not. This is often referred to as the “guided” vs. “unguided” Erie 
choice.
107
 Following Hanna, whether a state law is substantive within the mean-
ing of Erie is relevant only after a court has determined that the state law does 
not conﬂict with a federal statute or Rule and thus that the question is governed 
 
103. See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 37, at 41 (observing that “the Court has never held a Federal 
Rule invalid”); Bernadette Bollas Genetin, Reassessing the Avoidance Canon in Erie Cases, 44 
AKRON L. REV. 1067, 1095 (2011); Struve, supra note 19, at 1149. 
104. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965). 
105. Cf. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2120 (2016) 
(reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)) (arguing that “[w]hen courts 
apply doctrines that allow them to rewrite the laws (in effect), they are encroaching on the 
legislature’s Article I power”). The same logic applies here. Whether understood as an en-
croachment on Congress’s Article I legislative powers (that enable it to displace state law) or 
its Article I and Article III powers to create inferior federal courts (from which the delegated 
rulemaking power derives), judicial interpretations that broaden Federal Rules so expansively 
that they displace state substantive law in ways that are not textually unambiguous run up 
against separation-of-powers concerns. 
106. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 18 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
107. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471; see also Ely, supra note 35, at 698. 
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by the Rules of Decision Act.
108
 Otherwise, the state law and its substance are 
not at issue. 
Third, this view represents a questionable reading of the case law going back 
to Erie itself. In his Makaeff v. Trump University concurrence, Chief Judge 
Kozinski began from the premise that “the question of a conﬂict only arises if the 
state rule is substantive; state procedural rules have no application in federal 
court.”
109
 For this proposition, he cited Erie’s point that “‘the law to be applied 
in any [diversity] case is the law of the State’ except for ‘matters governed by the 
Federal Constitution or acts of Congress.’”
110
 But this assumes away the question 
posed by the conﬂicts stage: if there is no Federal Rule on point, it cannot be 
fairly said that the matter is governed by Congress. As Justice Stevens put it: “If 
the federal rule does not apply or can operate alongside the state rule, then there 
is no ‘Ac[t] of Congress’ governing that particular question.”
111
 
Fourth, there are substantial practical concerns—in particular judicial econ-
omy and risk of error—that counsel against resort to substantive-interest analy-
sis unless absolutely necessary.
112
 For these reasons, we ought to stick with the 
Walker ordering for Erie analysis: conﬂicts ﬁrst, without substance, then REA. 
But we are still left with how to assess the existence of conﬂicts in the ﬁrst stage 
of the analysis. That is the question to which I turn in Parts II and III. 
i i .  the role of statutory interpretation: federalism and 
avoidance 
Since the passage of the Rules Enabling Act, Erie has presented courts with 
a troublesome tension. They are tasked with balancing the uniformity of federal 
civil procedure against federalism and state autonomy, as well as against anti-
forum shopping and vertical equity concerns.
113
 Courts have struggled to bal-
ance these values because they inevitably conﬂict with each other. Any decision 
that preserves federal uniformity leaves less room for the operation of state law, 
 
108. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471. 
109. Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 273 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring). 
110. Id. (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)). 
111. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 421 (2010) (Stevens, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
112. See infra Section III.B. 
113. See generally Bauer, supra note 6 (discussing how choice of law principles can inform Erie doc-
trine given Erie’s goals of, inter alia, promoting uniformity, protecting state interests, and 
discouraging forum shopping); Ely, supra note 35 (arguing that courts have struggled to bal-
ance Erie’s competing values, in part because Erie is not a single doctrine but rather an amal-
gam of three distinct standards embracing these values to differing extents). 
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and vice versa. And the exact constitutional source of Erie’s holding has long 
been contentious, making it difficult to set clear boundaries in the service of 
Erie’s federalism value.
114
 This ambiguity is one reason why structural values 
like federalism are often underenforced, including in the Erie context.
115
 
After a period of disregarding the federal uniformity interest after Sibbach, 
the Court’s Erie jurisprudence turned sharply toward strict enforcement of that 
interest and relative neglect of federalism.
116
 Indeed, the main effect of Hanna 
has been to create a structural presumption in favor of the federal uniformity 
interest where the federal procedure in question is a rule promulgated under the 
Rules Enabling Act. Much of the work of the Court in Semtek and Gasperini, and 
of the concurrence and the dissent in Shady Grove, was to ﬁnd a counterweight 
to Hanna’s heavy thumb on the scale. 
In this Part, I argue that statutory interpretation—in particular a form of val-
ues-based avoidance—is the appropriate tool to address this problem.
117
 
A. The Expression of Constitutional Values in Statutory Interpretation 
Statutory interpretation seeks to provide rules and logic to guide judges’ de-
cisions in instances of ambiguity, particularly where that ambiguity has created 
 
114. Erie certainly implicates the Tenth Amendment at a general level, but that fact has proven 
insufficient to resolve these issues. Neither the Amendment nor the REA deﬁnes what powers 
remain reserved to the states, raising the same question courts have struggled to answer in 
Erie cases. Cf. Samuel Issacharoff, Federalized America: Reﬂections on Erie v. Tompkins and 
State-Based Regulation, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 199, 210-11 (2013) (questioning the Tenth 
Amendment as the source of Erie’s holding). 
115. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement 
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 630-31 (1992) (pointing out the un-
derenforcement of “structural” constitutional values, like federalism, relative to enumerated 
individual rights); Ernest A. Young, Popular Constitutionalism and the Underenforcement Prob-
lem: The Case of the National Healthcare Law, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 158-59 (2012) 
(observing that, like some other constitutional values, “[f]ederalism is . . . underenforced in 
current law”). 
116. See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 37, at 32 (“While expressing admiration for the Court’s at-
tempt to prevent the frustration of valid federal law under the cloud of the Court’s prior Erie 
jurisprudence, Justice Harlan expressed concern that it had moved ‘too fast and far in the 
other direction,’ effectively insulating the Federal Rules from challenge for improperly in-
fringing on state lawmaking prerogatives.” (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476 
(1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)); Ely, supra note 35, at 720. 
117. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 22, at 546-47 (discussing federalism and preemption canons); 
Vermeule, supra note 23, at 1948-49 (discussing the constitutional avoidance canon). 
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inconsistencies or other troublesome results.
118
 The Erie conﬂicts discussed in 
the Introduction present such a scenario: where the text and Advisory Commit-
tee Notes for a Federal Rule will support more than one plausible reading, courts 
are faced with an ambiguity of tremendous import and no established method-
ology for resolving it.
119
 This interpretive gap presents a problem, as the three-
way split in Shady Grove demonstrates, but also an opportunity to develop a 
canon that serves values implicated by, but underenforced in, current Erie juris-
prudence. 
1. Values-Based Statutory Interpretation 
Statutory interpretation is often an ideal place to inject constitutional values 
into our jurisprudence.
120
 As William Eskridge has written, statutory interpre-
tation is both a more frequent activity than constitutional review and a less po-
litically fraught endeavor.
121
 It is also a less risky one from the perspective of er-
ror correction: while undesirable interpretations can be revised by statutory 
override (or rulemaking), statutes that fall on the wrong side of constitutional 
review cannot be revived.
122
 Suffusing fundamental constitutional values into 
courts’ everyday interpretation of statutes and Rules ensures these values remain 
relevant. 
The case for values-based statutory interpretation is particularly strong in 
the context of Erie questions because common critiques of statutory interpreta-
tion are less salient when it comes to the Federal Rules.
123
 The countermajori-
tarian difficulty presents less of a concern because the Rules are already promul-
gated by the Supreme Court under the REA’s delegation.
124
 Congress assents to 
 
118. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie 
Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1970 (2011) (“[S]tatutory interpretation methodology might be 
understood as a set of rules that provides courts with a reasoning process.”). 
119. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
120. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 459 
(1989) (“Interpretive principles are often a product of constitutional norms.”). 
121. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 
1017 (1989). 
122. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 4 (1980). 
123. See Eskridge, supra note 121, at 1063 (articulating the countermajoritarian objection to values-
based statutory interpretation). 
124. Critically, the Rules themselves are not statutes and do not come with the same presumption 
of supremacy and preemptive power, even if they have the force of law. They are not products 
of bicameralism and presentment, and they lack the political safeguards of the congressional 
legislative process. Justice Frankfurter was clear on this point in Sibbach: “Plainly the Rules 
are not acts of Congress and cannot be treated as such.” Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 
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In the speciﬁc context of assessing Erie conﬂicts, construction of the Rules 
does not pit the Court’s interpretation against the legislature’s intent. (If any-
thing, it is likely to be the Advisory Committee’s or the Court’s intent that is in 
question.)
126
 The choice is between the application of Federal Rules or state law, 
which will often originate in state legislatures. Democratically speaking, narrow 
interpretations of the Federal Rules are on sounder footing than the most criti-
cized constructions of statutes (those that veer away from congressional intent), 
because narrow Rule interpretations often preserve state legislative intent. 
Furthermore, federalism is already among the constitutional values at work 
in our canons of statutory interpretation, so it is a ready candidate for use in the 
Erie context.
127
 I will not belabor the general point that federalism is a value of 
constitutional magnitude; much ink has been spilled justifying the importance 
of federalism and its role in safeguarding our democracy.
128
 But it is also among 
the structural constitutional values that are most often underenforced by 
courts.
129
 This is particularly true for Erie questions, where federalism as a back-




18 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Struve, supra note 19, at 1125 (comparing Fed-
eral Rules to agency rules but noting that they have even less claim to democratic accounta-
bility because the Court is less accountable than the President and executive agencies are); 
Thomas, supra note 4, at 257 n.352 (“Confusion regarding the effect of the federalism pre-
sumptions upon the meaning of Rules themselves appears to ﬂow from an erroneous theo-
retical assumption that the Rules themselves have the same status as statutes . . . .”). 
125. See Burbank, supra note 45, at 1018-19; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Sonia, What’s a Nice Person Like 
You Doing in Company Like That?, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 107, 108 (2010) (noting the “demo-
cratic deﬁcit” in the rulemaking process). 
126. See infra Section III.B.3. 
127. See Eskridge, supra note 121, at 1023-26; Sunstein, supra note 120, at 469 (“Although no sub-
stitute for an inquiry into the relationship between state and federal law in the particular con-
text, this principle [of federalism] will frequently aid interpretation in disputed cases.”). 
128. Among the commonly mentioned reasons relevant to Erie are the general interest in diffusion 
of sovereign power and the role of states as innovators, as competitors in a policy market, and 
as guarantors of legal rights. When federal courts displace state law with Federal Rules, they 
cut against all of these rationales. See Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse-
1983” in Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1233-46 (1994); Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., Steadying the Court’s “Unsteady” Path: A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1467-70 (1995); Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1549, 1552-56 (2012); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: 
Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1988). 
129. See Young, Ordinary Diet, supra note 26, at 319 (“[F]ederalism . . . has been underenforced at 
least since 1937 . . . .”). 
130. See Burbank, supra note 45, at 1032-33. 
an avoidance canon for erie 
509 
2. Erie’s Lost Federalism 
The question, then, is whether federalism is both so deeply rooted in Erie 
and so underserved by the Court’s current approach that it merits an interpretive 
canon. The answer is “yes.” The Erie decision itself reﬂects a deep-seated com-
mitment to federalism. The Erie Court intended to overturn Swift v. Tyson’s in-
vitation for federal courts to disregard state law in favor of general federal com-
mon law.
131
 It is for this reason that Ernest Young has called Erie “the most 
important federalism decision of the twentieth century.”
132
 Writing for the ma-
jority in Erie, Justice Brandeis bemoaned the fact that “state decisions . . . were 
disregarded”
133
 under Swift and emphatically concluded that “[e]xcept in mat-
ters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be 
applied in any case is the law of the State.”
134
 Erie’s federalism was manifest in 
the Court’s early Erie cases that read the Rules of Decision Act to be highly pro-




In addition to Erie’s traditional federalism-based concern with preserving 
the effect of state policies in federal court, Erie also reﬂected a deeper notion of 
federalism bound up in the separation of powers and constitutional structure. In 
Erie, Justice Brandeis quoted Justice Holmes’s judgment that general federal 
 
131. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842); see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations 
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 504-05 (1954) (describing Swift v. Tyson 
and the overlapping federal and state systems of substantive law it created). 
132. Young, supra note 8, at 18. 
133. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 76 (1938). 
134. Id. at 78. 
135. See Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945) (“Erie R.[R.] Co. v. Tompkins has been ap-
plied with an eye alert to essentials in avoiding disregard of State law in diversity cases in the 
federal courts. A policy so important to our federalism must be kept free from entanglements 
with analytical or terminological niceties.”); see also Ely, supra note 35, at 696 (“Beginning in 
the mid-1940’s and continuing into the late 1950’s, . . . the Court described Erie as considera-
bly more protective of state prerogatives[,] . . . requiring the application of state law whenever 
applying federal law instead might generate a different outcome.”). See generally Cohen v. 
Beneﬁcial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-57 (1949) (applying a New Jersey law requiring 
a shareholder to post bond for expenses, even though the Federal Rules did not require post-
ing bond); Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1949) (applying 
Kansas’s rules, rather than the Federal Rules, for determining when a statute of limitations 
has begun to run); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943) (holding that the “question 
of the burden of establishing contributory negligence is a question of local law which federal 
courts in diversity of citizenship cases must apply” (citation omitted)). 
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common law under Swift v. Tyson was “an unconstitutional assumption of pow-
ers by courts of the United States.”
136
 What, exactly, was that assumption? Al-
though Erie’s exact constitutional argument is notoriously unclear,
137
 Justice 
Brandeis presumably meant that because “Congress has no power to declare sub-
stantive rules of common law applicable in a state . . . [a]nd no clause in the 
Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts,” the exer-
cise of this power was unconstitutional.
138
 
This seems to be a familiar federalism, but decades of scholarly inquiry have 
helped identify and hone a second form of “judicial” or “legal process” federalism 
undergirding Erie. The ﬁrst clause of Justice Brandeis’s pronouncement—that 
Congress cannot declare rules of substantive common law applicable in the 
states—has become less and less true over time as the Court has affirmed exer-
cises of congressional authority that extend into far-reaching areas within the 
states.
139
  But expansive interpretations of Congress’s powers have no direct 
bearing on Justice Brandeis’s second claim—that federal courts have no power to 
declare substantive law within the states.
140
 
In this way, Erie highlights a fundamental tenet of the separation of powers: 
that federal judicial lawmaking authority is not coextensive with Congress’s law-
making authority.
141
 Congress retains the legislative power and with it the power 
to displace state law (or to delineate areas where federal courts can do so).
142
 




136. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab 
& Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
137. See Clark, supra note 9, at 1289 (“The constitutional rationale of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 
has remained elusive for almost seventy years.” (footnote omitted)). 
138. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
139. See Kevin M. Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 987, 
996-97 (2011); Gluck, supra note 8, at 1997-99; Issacharoff, supra note 114, at 212. 
140. To the extent that federal courts do wield such power, it is only when they are interpreting 
law in areas where Congress has already exercised its enumerated powers. See Young, Ordinary 
Diet, supra note 26, at 282. 
141. See Clark, Erie’s Constitutional Source, supra note 9, at 1302 (arguing that absent prior adoption 
of a “Law of the Land” through constitutionally legitimate sources, federal courts lack the 
constitutional authority to displace state law under the Supremacy Clause, which is the “ex-
clusive basis for overriding state law”); Young, supra note 8, at 69. 
142. See Young, supra note 9, at 1659. 
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gating its Article III rulemaking authority to the Court under the REA, that stat-
ute limits the scope of the delegation on its face.
143
 And that limitation was re-
inforced by the REA’s 1988 amendments, which prescribe speciﬁc procedures, 
including public notice and comment, for rulemaking.
144
 
From the perspective of federalism, this separation-of-powers issue matters 
for two reasons. First, avoiding expansive Rule interpretations, where others are 
at least plausible, channels displacement of state law through the formal REA 
process in which the political safeguards of federalism (i.e., state representation 
in Congress) have some opportunity to function.
145
 Second, just as the many 
veto gates and barriers to federal lawmaking generally constitute a constraint on 
federal action, forcing rule broadening to go through the formal REA process 




But Erie has not looked like a bastion of federalism for quite some time. 
Hanna constituted a turning point in the Court’s Erie jurisprudence that robbed 
it of much of its concern for federalism, at least once state law has been deter-
mined to conﬂict with a (valid) Federal Rule.
147
 Justice Harlan observed as much 
in his concurrence in Hanna, explaining that Erie was “one of the modern cor-
nerstones of our federalism . . . . The Court weakens, if indeed it does not sub-
merge, this basic principle by . . . setting up the Federal Rules as a body of law 
inviolate.”
148
 The enforcement of federalism and the separation of powers as 
bulwarks against the displacement of state law has been relegated to the conﬂicts 
stage of Erie analysis when dealing with a Federal Rule. It follows that the role 
of these paramount concerns is wholly dependent on the conﬂicts analysis pref-
erences of the court sitting in review.
149
 As we saw in Shady Grove, that plainly is 
 
143. See Kelleher, supra note 7, at 72-76; Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie—The 
Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1686-87 (1974); infra Section III.B.1. 
144. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 401, 102 Stat. 4642, 
4648 (1988) (codiﬁed at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073-2074 (2018)); see Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 
521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (“Courts are not free to amend a rule outside the process Congress 
ordered [in §§ 2073-2074] . . . .”); Struve, supra note 19, at 1126-30. 
145. See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 
1414 (2001). 
146. Cf. Young, supra note 8, at 115 (discussing the higher burden that multiple veto gates impose 
on federal lawmaking). 
147. See supra Section I.A.2. 
148. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-76 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
149. See supra Part I. 
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not enough and, in any case, has opened the door to unnecessary circuit splits 




We need an interpretive methodology for Erie conﬂicts that reﬂects concern 
for federalism while minimizing the opportunity for subjectivity and error. An 
avoidance canon is suited to assuaging such concerns.
151
 Interpretive avoidance 
involves the application of a default rule in favor of one sort of interpretation 
over another where doing so avoids the need to resolve an issue that would oth-
erwise be implicated, such as the constitutionality of a constitutionally suspect 
interpretation of a statute.
152
 
The theoretical underpinnings of avoidance canons as a form of default rule 
are twofold. First, there is the “cardinal principle” to “save and not to destroy” 
received from Justice Hughes’s opinion in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp.
153
 This principle derives from our constitutional norm of legislative su-
premacy and seeks to minimize the extent to which unelected judges substitute 
their judgment for that of elected bodies.
154
 Second, avoidance is rooted in the 
inherent fallibility of human judges, the omnipresent risk of error where open-





150. See supra Introduction. 
151. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 23, at 118. 
152. See Vermeule, supra note 23, at 1948-49. Vermeule notes that there are multiple types of inter-
pretive avoidance, including strong and weak forms (or “modern” and “classical” forms, as he 
describes them). Strong avoidance asks only whether an interpretation might be unconstitu-
tional without actually deciding the question of constitutionality before defaulting to the 
clearly constitutional reading; weak avoidance requires actually deciding that one interpreta-
tion would be unconstitutional before defaulting to the other. Id. Avoidance, especially of the 
strong variety, is not without its critics. Many scholars have noted that strong avoidance may 
lead judges to construe statutes in ways Congress never intended to avoid alleged constitu-
tional inﬁrmities. See, e.g., HENRY J. FRIENDLY, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Stat-
utes, in BENCHMARKS 196, 209-12 (1967); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the 
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 816 (1983). Although this poses prob-
lems for legislative supremacy, these avoidance problems are less salient in the context of the 
canon I propose here. See supra notes 123-125 and accompanying text. 
153. 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937); see Vermeule, supra note 23, at 1952-53. 
154. See Robert L. Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARV. L. REV. 
76, 96-101 (1937). 
155. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 200 (2d ed. 1986); Kloppenberg, supra note 23, at 1015-16. 
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To brieﬂy draw a few parallels to the present subject, the conﬂicts stage of 
Erie analysis implicates the same concerns for protecting legislative supremacy 
and avoiding error. In determining that a Federal Rule conﬂicts with state law, a 
court places the two in zero-sum competition. Once a court proceeds to the REA 
analysis stage, one of the two will not be applied at all. By contrast, the adoption 
of a reading that avoids the conﬂict allows both the Federal Rule and state law 
to have at least partial effect. This follows Justice Hughes’s “cardinal principle” 
by saving rather than destroying the state law. Further, the state laws in question 
are themselves often the product of state legislative action.
156
 Finally, the lack of 
a consistent and coherent Erie conﬂicts framework creates the same potential for 
error and bias. Today, a reviewing court at the conﬂicts stage may apply whatever 
methodology it chooses. We know how that goes.
157
 
i i i .  a federalism-based avoidance canon for erie 
questions 
The challenge, then, is what canon or default rule can be brought to bear on 
these Erie problems. In this Part, I take up that challenge by proposing a feder-
alism-based avoidance canon, offering ﬁve arguments in support and assessing 
the shortcomings of a variety of counterarguments and existing alternatives. 
A. Applying a Federalism-Based Avoidance Canon 
My federalism-based avoidance canon is simple: at the conﬂicts stage, judges 
should ask whether there is a reading of the Federal Rule that can be plausibly 
supported by its text and the Advisory Committee Notes that does not conﬂict 
with the state law in question based on the plain textual meaning of that law. If 
the answer is “yes,” the court sitting in diversity should default to the reading 
that does not conﬂict with state law. This canon would rely on the existing pre-
sumption against preemption. It would require either clear textual intent to 
preempt state law in a given ﬁeld of procedure (e.g., language indicating that a 
list of procedural elements is exhaustive and cannot be supplemented) or a ﬁnd-
ing by a court that there is no plausible reading of the Federal Rule under which 




156. See Hart, supra note 131, at 492, 534; Thomas, supra note 4, at 207-14 (discussing the legislative 
action and intent underlying the rules at issue in Gasperini and Shady Grove). 
157. See supra Part I. 
158. Cf. Young, Ordinary Diet, supra note 26, at 271-72 (discussing clear statement rules and the 
presumption against preemption). This is not to say the default outcome is completely rigid. 
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A court using this approach to interpret Rule 23, as in Shady Grove, would 
ﬁrst consider whether the interpretation put forward by the dissent (and the 
Second Circuit) is plausible on the basis of the text and Advisory Committee 
Notes. The Committee Notes prior to 2003 said nothing about the scope of rem-
edies, only that class certiﬁcation hinged on “satisfaction of the terms” in the 
Rule providing the requirements for class actions.
159
 The 2003 Notes added only 
that “proceedings to deﬁne the remedy may demonstrate the need to amend the 
class deﬁnition or subdivide the class.”
160
 This suggests some relationship be-
tween class maintenance and remedies, but in no way precludes the dissent’s 
reading. Given that the answer to the ﬁrst question is “yes,” the court would 
default to the reading not in conﬂict with state law, avoiding the need for REA 
analysis. That’s it. 
B. The Case for Federalism-Based Avoidance 
This simpliﬁed avoidance canon at the conﬂicts stage is far less methodolog-
ically complex than the avoidance models in either the concurrence or dissent in 
Shady Grove. It does not require deep analysis of the substantive goals embodied 
in Federal Rules or state law—only analysis of the Rule’s text and Advisory Com-
mittee Notes.
161
 It is far less susceptible to individual discretion and error. In this 
 
Direct textual implication of sufficiently important federal interests, e.g., the Seventh Amend-
ment interest in the provision of federal jury trials, could trump the default rule favoring ap-
plication of state law. But this sort of trumping should not be done lightly. It would require 
direct textual evidence of an interest of sufficient magnitude to warrant state law displace-
ment. (The federal uniformity interest would not be enough on its own.) If a federal interest 
is of sufficient magnitude to displace state law, it is not too much to ask of Rule drafters that 
they put some direct reference to that interest in the Rule’s text. Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural 
Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537-39 (1958) (highlighting “the inﬂuence of the Seventh 
Amendment” in trumping the application of state law). In any case, I do not expect this sort 
of trumping to be common given the manifestly procedural nature of most Federal Rules. 
More importantly, rules with textual hooks for vital federal interests are unlikely to be ambig-
uous with respect to whether they preempt state law. And under the regime I propose, more 
rules will include such textual evidence because of the ex ante incentive to make preemption 
clear. 
159. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1) advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment. 
160. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1) advisory committee’s notes to 2003 amendment. 
161. The use of Committee Notes to supplement the text in assessing the meaning of Federal Rules 
is a well-established practice for the Court. See Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 31 (1986) 
(noting that when interpreting a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, “the construction given by 
the Committee is of weight” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Miss. Publ’g 
Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946) (using the Advisory Committee Notes to aid 
Rule interpretation and noting that “in ascertaining [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s] 
meaning the construction given to them by the Committee is of weight”); see also Class v. 
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Section, I outline ﬁve additional arguments in favor of a generalized federalism-
based conﬂict-avoidance canon for Erie. 
1. Consonance with Existing Canons: Constitutional Doubts and 
Antipreemption 
A federalism-based avoidance canon best comports with existing canons of 
statutory interpretation, given ongoing doubts about the scope of Congress’s 
delegation under the REA.
162
 Congress’s power to regulate the practice and pro-
cedure of federal courts derives from its Article I and Article III powers to create 
lower federal courts and the implications of the Necessary and Proper Clause in 
the context of exercising those powers.
163
 Although federal courts also have 
some inherent powers to regulate procedure, at least on a case-by-case basis, the 
Court has never deﬁned the scope of these powers or indicated that they extend 




United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 806 (2018) (using Advisory Committee Notes to interpret the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 64 n.6 (2002) (com-
menting that when interpreting the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[i]n the absence of 
a clear legislative mandate, the Advisory Committee Notes provide a reliable source of insight 
into the meaning of a rule”); Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 315-16 (1988) 
(citing Committee Notes in interpretation of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure); Ge-
netin, supra note 103, at 1133-35; Struve, supra note 19, at 1152-69. In his dissent in Class, Justice 
Alito argued that Advisory Committee Notes are actually better than typical legislative history 
because they are formally integrated into the rulemaking process and submitted to each rele-
vant institution along with proposed rules. 138 S. Ct. at 808 n.2. Most important, and distin-
guishing the use of the Committee Notes in the face of common critiques of legislative history 
in adjudication, the Notes are canonical. They are submitted in a deﬁned context, rather than 
in multiple forms from multiple sources, as is the case for most legislative history. See Adrian 
Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy 
Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1867-77 (1998) (discussing the challenges of volume 
and heterogeneity that raise comprehensiveness and salience problems for legislative history). 
162. See supra Section II.A.2. 
163. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (“[T]he constitutional provision for a federal 
court system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional 
power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts, which in turn in-
cludes a power to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between 
substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classiﬁcation as either.”); Kelleher, supra 
note 7, at 62. 
164. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991) (defending courts’ “inherent power 
to . . . sanction”); United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (rec-
ognizing “[c]ertain implied powers,” such as the power to “ﬁne for contempt—imprison for 
contumacy—inforce [sic] the observance of order,” which are “not immediately derived from 
statute”); see also Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 799 (1987); Burbank, 
supra note 45, at 1115; Kelleher, supra note 7, at 65. 
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Whatever initial constitutional allocation of rulemaking power exists, the 
combination of uncertainty around the scope of REA delegation, the Court’s 
precedents, and broader separation-of-powers concerns is sufficient to warrant 
a presumption against interpreting Federal Rules to displace state law under the 
existing constitutional-doubts and antipreemption canons. 
First, whatever inherent rulemaking power the courts have does not include 
the ability to displace state law, especially where that law is at least arguably sub-
stantive.
165
 This was the main holding of Erie: the making of general federal 
common law that displaces state law is “an unconstitutional assumption of pow-
ers by courts of the United States.”
166
 Further, as Paul Mishkin has pointed out, 
“states, and their interests as such, are represented in the Congress but not in the 
federal courts.”
167
 The political safeguards of federalism that justify Congress’s 
power to displace state law through the exercise of its enumerated powers do not 
exist in courts’ exercise of their unenumerated (and highly limited) rulemaking 
powers.
168
 Nothing about our constitutional structure suggests that the Court, 
absent some speciﬁc grant of statutory authority, can act on its own to displace 
state substantive law. Where possible, the Court’s ability to displace state law on 
its own should be curtailed.
169
 
Second, Congress has delegated only a portion of its rulemaking power to 
the Court via the REA and conditioned that delegation on a set of deﬁned pro-
cesses.
170
 On its face, the REA’s delegation does not include the full extent of 
Congress’s rulemaking power; it explicitly denies the Court rulemaking author-
ity that would displace state law providing for substantive rights.
171
 And the 
 
165. See Henry P. Monaghan, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 87 
HARV. L. REV. 889, 892 (1974) (book review) (“Erie is, fundamentally, a limitation on the 
federal court’s power to displace state law absent some relevant constitutional or statutory 
mandate which neither the general language of [A]rticle III nor the jurisdictional statute pro-
vides.”). 
166. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer 
Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing)); see supra Section II.A. 
167. Mishkin, supra note 143, at 1685. 
168. See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in 
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954) (ex-
plaining the theory of safeguards for federalism embedded in the political process, especially 
Congress). 
169. See Young, Ordinary Diet, supra note 26, at 279-80. 
170. See supra Section II.A. 
171. See Jonathan M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions 
and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842, 849-55 (1974). 
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Act’s legislative history conﬁrms it was intended as only a partial delegation.
172
 
There is clearly some category of state substantive law beyond the reach of the 
Court’s delegated powers.
173
 Where the Court displaces that law, it is transgress-
ing its constitutional boundaries by exercising powers held exclusively by Con-
gress. 
Third, the text of the REA itself is more concerned with where not to preempt 
state law than where preemption might be intended, although presumably 
preemption of state procedural law in federal court is implied. The second clause, 
barring Rules that “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,” is an an-
tipreemptive carve-out.
174
 The question of speciﬁc preemptive intent regarding 
procedure is thus delegated to the Court, and any intent to displace state law 
would have to be found in the relevant Rule’s text. From a statutory perspective, 
the Court is on shaky ground when its Rules ostensibly preempt arguably sub-
stantive state law, especially when the Rule text itself is ambiguous. Because 
Rules are enacted by default if Congress does not object, ambiguous rules cannot 




These three premises imply that the Court’s existing constitutional-doubts 
and antipreemption canons support avoiding Erie conﬂicts under the REA by 
defaulting to plausible nonconﬂicting interpretations. Under the constitutional-
doubts canon, courts interpret statutes to avoid readings that cast doubt on a 
statute’s constitutionality.
176
 Under the modern application of this doctrine, se-
rious doubts are enough to trigger avoidance; an affirmative ruling of unconsti-
tutionality is not needed.
177
 
A Federal Rule that could alter substantive rights by displacing state sub-
stantive law raises constitutional doubts concerning the separation of powers be-
cause it may be beyond the scope of both the Court’s inherent powers and its 
delegated powers under the REA.
178
 Under a faithful application of the modern 
 
172. See Burbank, supra note 45, at 1025. 
173. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 422 (2010) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Mishkin, supra note 143, at 1686. 
174. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2018); see Thomas, supra note 4, at 243-44. 
175. See Thomas, supra note 4, at 242-50; supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
176. See Vermeule, supra note 23, at 1949. 
177. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 
568, 575 (1988) (citing NLRB. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 499-501, 504 (1979)); 
see also Kloppenberg, supra note 23, at 1027-35. 
178. The procedures for rule promulgation added in the 1988 amendments to the REA raise a sep-
arate concern. § 2073. If, as the Court stated in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, “[c]ourts are 
not free to amend a rule outside the process Congress ordered [in § 2073],” then adoption of 
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constitutional-doubts canon, such a reading should be abandoned when the 
Rule’s text can support an alternative nonconﬂicting construction. With strict 
separation of the conﬂicts and REA stages of Erie analysis, it is both possible and 




Suppose, though, that a court is unconvinced that these doubts rise to the 
level needed to trigger constitutional avoidance.
180
 Canons holding that statutes 
should not be interpreted to preempt state law without clear intent (and, in some 
cases, a clear statement) provide additional reasons to default to nonconﬂicting 
readings.
181
 Although the REA as a whole contemplates preemption of state pro-
cedural law in federal court, it explicitly disavows preemption of state substan-
tive law.
182
 Preemptive intent must be discernable in the text or structure of the 
Rule itself, or at least of the Rule’s Advisory Committee Notes, if assuming con-
gressional acquiescence is to be even remotely reasonable. Where Rules are am-
biguous, that is not the case. This framework casts doubt upon the constitutional 
basis for displacement of state law by such Rules.
183
 Where two plausible inter-
pretations can be supported by a Rule’s text and at least one does not preempt 
state substantive law, courts should choose the nonpreemptive reading. Thus, 
whichever existing canon is applied, adopting narrower, nonconﬂicting inter-
pretations is proper. 
2. Protection of State Interests 
A presumption in favor of nonconﬂicting interpretations will better protect 
state interests. It hardly needs to be noted that the line between substance and 
 
interpretations that displace state law where such application is neither clearly intended nor neces-
sary may also transgress the Court’s statutory boundaries because they bypass the procedural 
limitations on Congress’s delegation. 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997); see also Struve, supra note 19, 
at 1126-30. 
179. See supra Section I.B. 
180. Although many, including Justice Stevens, would say they do. See Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 422 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (observing that only Congress has “the constitutional power ‘to 
supplant state law’ with rules that are ‘rationally capable of classiﬁcation as procedure’” (quot-
ing id. at 406 (plurality opinion))). 
181. See BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 
460 (1991); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 237 (1947). 
182. See supra Section II.A.2. 
183. See Thomas, supra note 4, at 242-45. 




 What is more pertinent is that states clearly use arguably 
procedural laws to accomplish arguably substantive goals (and instantiate sub-
stantive rights), so an Erie approach that frequently overrides state law will nec-
essarily undermine state policies and regulatory goals.
185
 Prominent examples 
include rules barring the introduction of evidence of not wearing a seatbelt in 
contributory negligence claims and rules affecting all manner of tort and litiga-
tion reforms.
186
 The substantial extent to which the REA—as construed by Sib-
bach, Hanna, and Shady Grove’s plurality opinion—facilitates displacement of 
these state regulatory policies necessitates an additional layer of protection. In a 
federalist system, protecting state interests matters.
187
 
3. Consistency, Accuracy, and Judicial Economy 
Default rules are generally more likely to produce consistent outcomes in like 
cases than is ad hoc judicial reasoning. Legal consistency breeds fairness and pre-
dictability,
188
 both of which have been particularly lacking in the Court’s Erie 
conﬂicts jurisprudence and lower court decisions.
189
 More important, a default 
rule for Erie conﬂicts will not only be more consistent, but will also improve ju-
dicial economy while minimizing error. 
First, interest-balancing approaches are particularly error-prone relative to a 
default rule. As Adrian Vermeule argues, where the resolution of legal questions 
depends on party-driven fact-ﬁnding, parsing voluminous materials, and as-
sessing the ambiguous content of heterogeneous sources, the risk of error and of 
 
184. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 419 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment); Kelleher, supra note 7, at 58-59. 
185. See Kelleher, supra note 7, at 69 (“A legal rule can have both procedural and substantive pur-
poses, and even if the animating policies of a rule ostensibly are procedural, it may have sig-
niﬁcant substantive implications, whether intended or not.”); Thomas, supra note 4, at 220 
(“[S]tates use procedural tools to shape wide-ranging policy goals.”); Whitten, supra note 11, 
at 132 (“[S]tate legislatures often create procedural rules for reasons that have nothing to do 
with the sort of efficiency policies that normally underpin such rules. Rather, the reasons often 
embody policies that are directed at limiting the scope of claims, defenses, or remedies avail-
able for the violation of primary rights existing under state law.”). 
186. See LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 513 (4th ed. 2009); Lynch, supra 
note 12, at 285-86. 
187. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
188. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL 
INTERPRETATION 219 (2006). 
189. See supra Introduction and Part I. 
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decision-making based on judges’ individual policy preferences will increase.
190
 
All of these factors are present in the interest-balancing approaches employed in 
Shady Grove. Indeed, the concurrence and dissent split on their readings of the 
legislative history of the New York provision at issue, which Justice Stevens ad-
mitted “d[id] not clearly describe” the provision’s operation.
191
 Justice Stevens’s 
reference to what class action opponents supporting the law “may have felt”
192
 
and Justice Ginsburg’s invocation of the “most likely explanation”
193
 for the stat-
ute’s wording are suggestive of the difficulties inherent in this approach.
194
 Sub-
stantive purpose cannot be treated as a reliable barometer of scope for conﬂicts 
purposes. 
Second, the speciﬁc institutional features of Erie conﬂicts raise the risk of 
judicial error. For better or worse, federal judges are creatures of the federal 
courts. They are relatively less familiar with state law and state political ecosys-
tems than they are with federal law and politics. They are thus comparatively 
worse equipped for tasks that rely on knowledge of state law.
195
 These problems 
are magniﬁed when federal judges must ﬁll in interpretive gaps based on judg-
ments of legislative intent for political systems from which they are relatively 
removed. This difficulty is further compounded by the speciﬁc features of the 
state laws in many Erie cases. When the substantive goals of a law are distinct 
from its facially procedural operation, intent is especially hard to pin down. And 
when federal judges are tasked with balancing the state substantive interests they 
unearth against the federal interests embodied in Federal Rules, we should be 
vigilant about the impartiality of this weighing. Federal interests will usually hit 
closer to home for federal judges than state law concerns. And because the Fed-
eral Rules apply in all federal civil actions, while any given state law will arise in 
federal court only rarely, federal procedural uniformity will always make the jobs 
of federal judges easier. 
 
190. See Vermeule, supra note 161, at 1857-77. While Vermeule makes this argument in the context 
of the legislative history debates, his reasoning is generalizable. 
191. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 433 (2010) (Stevens, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
192. Id. at 434. 
193. Id. at 453 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
194. My point here is not a broad indictment of legislative history; it is to say (1) that judicial 
economy and error-risk concerns are heightened for statutes whose facially procedural content 
differs from their substantive ends and (2) that bearing these risks is not necessary when a 
default rule can accomplish the same normative goals. 
195. See Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts: Restoring a Workable Balance, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1293, 1300 (2003) (“[F]ederal courts often get state law wrong because federal judges don’t 
know state law and are not the ultimate decisionmakers on it.”); see also Young, supra note 8, 
at 55 (noting that “state courts . . . have a comparative advantage in construing state law”). 
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The federal-judge-heavy composition of the Rules Advisory Committees 
and Standing Committee, as well as the exclusively federal composition of the 
Judicial Conference, suggest at the very least that Federal Rules will reﬂect inter-
ests that resonate with federal judges. In some cases, federal judges presiding 
over diversity cases may have even been involved in promulgating the Rule at 
issue.
196
 The same cannot be said for state law. These challenges to an interest-
based approach to Erie conﬂicts, if one is concerned with federalism, make the 
inquiry a prime candidate for a default rule. 
None of this is to say that default rules entirely eliminate normative prefer-
ences from adjudication. Rather, the point is that a default rule based on a trans-
parent normative premise (in this case, federalism) can be applied more consist-
ently and fairly than an ad hoc approach that leaves normative judgments to the 
balancing whims of the particular judges in each case. 
4. Democratic Legitimacy and Error Correction 
Courts should default to nonconﬂicting constructions for a fourth reason: 
democratic legitimacy. State law is equally, if not more, democratically legitimate 
than the Federal Rules. In nearly all cases, the Federal Rules and amendments to 
them are produced through congressional inaction rather than meaningful legis-
lative debate and vote.
197
 This “democratic deﬁcit” is not lost on commentators, 
but has mostly engendered arguments for a broader reading of the REA’s limi-
tations on alteration of substantive rights.
198
 Although, under Erie, “state law” 
comprises judge-made law as well as state statutes, nearly all of the complex Erie 
cases producing potential conﬂicts have involved statutes with more democratic 




196. See Membership of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and Advisory Rules Commit-
tees, U.S. CTS. (Mar. 16, 2018), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/2017_committee
_roster.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XKR-DK9H]; see also Thomas, supra note 4, at 249-50 (ar-
guing that the Federal Rules are unlikely to reﬂect state interests and noting that, at the time 
of her writing, there was only one state judge on the Standing Committee). 
197. See Struve, supra note 19, at 1104; supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
198. See Rowe, supra note 125, at 108. 
199. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (concluding that state law is valid 
whether “declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision”). And 
even where state law at issue in Erie conﬂicts is judge-made, state judges are still likely to be 
more directly democratically accountable than federal judges because they are often elected. 
See Young, supra note 8, at 56. 
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For reasons related to their democratic deﬁcit, Federal Rules are relatively 
easy to amend.
200
 Although there have been notable exceptions, amendments to 
Federal Rules are frequently insulated from public pressure.
201
 Further, the dif-
ﬁculty of reaching majorities in both chambers of Congress to override a Rule 
amendment means that the weight of legislative inertia falls on the side of mak-
ing Rule amendment easier, not harder.
202
 For example, in 1993, despite politi-
cized opposition to amendments to Rule 26’s discovery provisions, the amend-
ments passed because the Senate failed to reach an agreement and pass a version 
of the House bill that would have removed the mandatory discovery rules at is-
sue.
203
 More to the point, when Rules are uncontroversial and outside the polit-
ical limelight, amendment will be at its easiest because Congress will have little 
incentive to intervene. When amendments are controversial, the formal rule-
making process gives states an opportunity to access the political safeguards of 
federalism present in Congress and absent in the courts. 
Critical to my proposal is the assumption that if an application of the Erie 
avoidance canon results in an interpretation of a Rule contrary to the intent of 
the Court or Committees, it can be reversed by proposing a new Rule that Con-
gress chooses not (or fails) to override.
204
 A canon that presumes against dis-
placement of state law by Federal Rules offers two institutional-choice ad-
vantages in achieving the right balance between the interests of the Court and 
Committees in procedural uniformity and the interests of the states in achieving 
their substantive goals. 
First, this default rule properly matches the burden of action in the rulemak-
ing process. For a proposed Rule to take effect and potentially displace a state 
statute, all that is required is congressional inaction. In contrast, states worried 
 
200. This is not to say they are “easy” to amend in an absolute sense, only relatively so. Amending 
the Rules still requires agreement (or at least nonveto) by four distinct bodies before a pro-
posed Rule or amendment reaches Congress: the Advisory Committee, the Standing Com-
mittee, the Judicial Conference, and the Supreme Court. See Struve, supra note 19, at 1109. 
This is, in part, the basis for my earlier contention that my proposed canon is not likely to be 
amended out of existence by frequent overrides. There are enough veto gates in the rulemak-
ing process that narrow readings are likely to stand, even if Rule amendment is still easier 
than mobilizing Congress. 
201. See id. at 1111 (noting that even though the 1988 amendments to the REA were designed to 
attract more public attention to rulemaking, “noncontroversial proposals often attract little 
attention from practitioners or other members of the public”). 
202. See Kelleher, supra note 7, at 99 (“Sometimes Congress’[s] failure to act [to override a pro-
posed Rule] reﬂects only the failure of both the House and the Senate to agree on the language 
of the legislation.”). 
203. See id. at 57-58. 
204. See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 3, at 739. 
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about the displacement of important policies must mobilize to convince Con-
gress to proactively overrule a Rule, surely a higher burden.
205
 
Second, placing the onus on the Court and Committees will likely result in 
faster error correction.
206
 The case for an interpretive default rule is particularly 
strong when institutions are arrayed in a manner that facilitates correction of 
interpretations contrary to the rulemaking body’s intent. In Einer Elhauge’s ter-
minology, “preference-eliciting canons” are justiﬁed by the availability of legis-
lative correction because eliciting speciﬁc corrective action “will produce a . . . re-
sult that embodies enactable preferences more accurately than any judicial 
estimate could.”
207
 That is, a canon that results in higher rates of ﬁxable error is 
preferable to one that results in lower rates of nonﬁxable error, as the former will 
encourage a productive judicial-legislative dialogue that best matches interpre-
tation to intent in the long run.
208
 
This is true of Federal Rules. Suppose lower courts adopt broad readings of 
Federal Rules that displace state law. States will need to wait years for a case on 
point to make its way through the federal court system to the Supreme Court, 
which might never happen at all. In contrast, if lower federal courts begin to 
adopt narrow readings that do not reﬂect rule drafters’ intent, the Court or Com-
mittees can take advantage of the REA to correct the Rule’s text to reﬂect their 
preemptive intent relatively more expediently.
209
 If not perfect, it is at least faster 
than waiting for the Court. 
5. Forum Shopping and Equity 
As a consequence of more frequent application of state law in federal courts, 
this approach will better serve Erie’s twin aims of “discouragement of forum-
shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”
210
 The logic 
is simple. Whenever a Federal Rule displaces state law in federal court, it results 
 
205. See id. 
206. See VERMEULE, supra note 188, at 74-79 (explaining error correction as a criterion for interpre-
tive approaches); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2162, 2165 (2002) (arguing that preference-eliciting canons yield superior results by 
prompting corrections and are most effective where the burden of doing so falls on a group 
that is procedurally or politically empowered). 
207. EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 152 
(2008). 
208. See id. at 153-54. 
209. See Struve, supra note 19, at 1134-35. 
210. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
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in different legal standards in state and federal courts.
211
 A federalism-based 
avoidance canon would minimize these differences. 
Of course, this minimization comes at the expense of uniformity in the fed-
eral system, at least in the short term. If uniformity is seriously threatened, 
though, the “override button” of amending Rules still rests with federal 
courts.
212
 And, as I discuss below, limits on uniformity within the federal system 




C. Responding to Counterarguments 
No interpretive approach is perfect. Below, I address ﬁve potential counter-
arguments to my proposal and explain why, on balance, they are outweighed. In 
addition to these speciﬁc counterarguments, there is also a risk of error in the 
application of this canon, as there is in any interpretive enterprise. Nevertheless, 




1. Disuniformity in Federal Courts 
Any Erie approach that privileges federalism and anti-forum shopping runs 
the risk of disrupting the uniformity of federal procedure. My canon could result 
in interpretations of Federal Rules that differ based on the nature of subject-
matter jurisdiction and relevant state law.
215
 Depending on how this canon is 
applied, disuniformity could become a genuine problem by putting a substantial 





211. See Roosevelt, supra note 1, at 32-33. 
212. See VERMEULE, supra note 188, at 78 (suggesting that interpretation should be concerned with 
“whether and when formalist decisions that produce clear mistakes will be corrected . . . and 
whether the corrections have low or high costs”). 
213. See infra Section III.C.1. 
214. See supra Section II.B. 
215. See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 3, at 744 (bemoaning the effect of narrowing interpreta-
tions where “supposedly uniform federal procedural rules become two-headed monsters 
meaning different things depending on whether the plaintiff’s claim is based on state or fed-
eral law”); Suzanna Sherry, Normalizing Erie, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1227 (2016). 
216. See Bauer, supra note 44, at 963; see also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 559 U.S. 393, 404 (2010) (condemning the “arduous” task of doing state-by-state analy-
sis, especially when determining a state law’s purpose is required). 
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But this concern is overblown. The REA never intended to achieve full uni-
formity; the existence of any sphere of application for state law in diversity ac-
tions ensures some differences, for which the REA itself provides. Rule 83 even 
authorizes district courts to adopt their own local rules.
217
 Part of this is moti-
vated by Erie’s twin aims, in particular deterring forum shopping. For instance, 
the differential application of Federal Rules like Rule 3 (applied not only to gov-
ern commencement of actions in diversity cases but also to control tolling in fed-
eral-question cases) offers vertical uniformity in exchange, limiting vertical fo-
rum shopping.
218
  In any case, the federal courts do not yet seem to have 
crumbled under the weight of these (fairly uncomplicated) differential applica-
tions. If disuniformity becomes a signiﬁcant issue, the Court and Committees 
can always amend the Rule in question to preempt relevant state law. 
2. Perverse Incentives for State Rulemaking 
Others might argue that a federalism-based avoidance canon would encour-
age states to pass laws that occupy greater portions of the relevant ﬁeld of pro-
cedure—to preempt the preemption.
219
 That result surely would be “intolera-
ble,”
220
 but it is not likely to occur. Indeed, the opposite result is just as likely. 
Under an avoidance canon applied at the conﬂicts stage and paired with the 
Shady Grove plurality’s reading of Hanna and Sibbach at the REA stage, states 
would be incentivized not to overstep the necessary scope of procedural laws be-
cause doing so would increase the difficulty of ﬁnding plausible nonconﬂicting 
readings of Federal Rules. That is, the broader a state law, the more likely it is to 
conﬂict with Federal Rules. It would then be displaced by those Federal Rules 
under Hanna and Sibbach. Indeed, the point is that only stricter policing of the 
REA’s second clause at the second step of the analysis would create such an in-
centive. If Federal Rules will continue to be applied where conﬂict is unavoidable 
regardless of substantive effect, states cannot enlarge their scope of authority by 
courting conﬂict. 
 
217. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a); Thomas, supra note 4, at 245. 
218. See Steinman, supra note 2, at 1151. 
219. See Roosevelt, supra note 1, at 39 (“If a Rule that modiﬁes a substantive right is invalid, then 
it seems that a single state could void a Rule by enacting a substantive law in conﬂict with it—
void the Rule, that is, in the sense that it could not be applied even in states without such 
conﬂicting laws, or in federal question cases. That result is surely intolerable . . . .”). 
220. Id. 
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3. Discretion for Expansive Self-Interpretation 
Some have also argued that the Court has discretion to expansively deter-
mine its own rules.
221
 The Court has better knowledge of its own intent than 
any other body. And it has already been delegated the power to make rules of 
procedure and thus should be less concerned with separation-of-powers prob-
lems than in statutory interpretation, so the argument goes.
222
 
But even if this view is correct, it does not absolve the Court of its federalism 
obligations or supersede the limits of the REA’s delegation, to which the Court 
has not always been especially attentive. The fact that the Court may know its 
true intent does not mean Congress did or that Congress would not have over-
ridden the Rule had the preemption been clear.
223
 
Moreover, without an interpretive canon to narrow its discretion, the Court 
could in theory enlarge its own rulemaking powers with vague Rules and broad 
interpretations, given limited congressional oversight.
224
 As Justice Scalia noted 
in Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center regarding agencies’ interpre-
tations of their own rules, such a situation “violate[s] a fundamental principle of 
separation of powers—that the power to write a law and the power to interpret 
it cannot rest in the same hands.”
225
 Although on paper the Court merely advises 
Congress on what Rules or amendments to pass, in practice the Court often has 
the ﬁnal word, given the infrequency with which Congress intervenes.
226
 This 
separation-of-powers issue can be avoided by applying my canon to force the 
promulgation or amendment of Rules with preemptive effect to go through the 
deﬁned process Congress has created, a process where the political safeguards of 





221. See, e.g., Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1093 (1993). 
222. See Joseph P. Bauer, Schiavone: An Un-Fortune-ate Illustration of the Supreme Court’s Role as 
Interpreter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 720, 729 (1988). 
223. See Burbank, supra note 45, at 1019 (observing that Rules are often promulgated with little 
congressional interest or input). 
224. See Struve, supra note 19, at 1119-20 (arguing that because allowing the Court to take expan-
sive readings “enlarges the powers of the courts beyond their proper boundaries . . . courts 
should have, if anything, less latitude to interpret the Rules than they do to interpret stat-
utes”). 
225. 568 U.S. 597, 619 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Struve, 
supra note 19, at 1168. 
226. See supra Section III.B.4. 
227. 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (2018). 
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4. Difficulty Accounting for Federal Interests 
At ﬁrst glance, my canon might appear to make it more difficult for federal 
courts to exercise discretion to protect implied federal interests. Suzanna Sherry 
has objected to the Erie doctrine for this reason, and my proposed canon would 
only amplify the issue by limiting the ways in which giving weight to federal 
interests can enter a court’s calculus.
228
 In Sherry’s view, Erie’s “federalism” 
mandates the application of state law unless a federal interest has been codiﬁed. 
In contrast, “ordinary federalism” relies on a rebuttable presumption in favor of 
state law that can be overcome by a court’s decision to prioritize unarticulated 
federal interests.
229
 Sherry thus views Erie as anomalous and proposes that we 
“normalize” the doctrine by “recogniz[ing] the courts’ authority to overcome the 




Sherry’s argument is unpersuasive for four reasons. First, it neglects existing 
federalism doctrines that cut against “ordinary federalism,” most notably the 
presumption against preemption and the clear statement canon of Gregory v. Ash-
croft.
231
 While there are some canons that support Sherry’s position, Erie is by 
no means extraordinary, particularly when it is situated among the federalism 
approaches taken during the Rehnquist Court’s “federalist revival.”
232
 
Second, at least with respect to Erie questions that fall under the REA, Erie 
is already normalized to giving preference to federal interests. The Hanna-Sib-
bach test mandates the application of arguably procedural Federal Rules that 
would displace arguably substantive state law, even without evidence or consid-
eration of an unarticulated federal interest. Sherry’s worry that unarticulated 
federal interests nonetheless present in a federal statute (or Rule) cannot over-
come state law in Erie cases is only true under the Rules of Decision Act, not the 
REA. For cases that fall under the REA, there are good reasons to prevent federal 
interests not manifested in the text of the relevant Rule from displacing state law. 
 
228. See Sherry, supra note 215, at 1164. 
229. See id. at 1167-68. 
230. Id. at 1216. 
231. See 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991); ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 22, at 546-47. 
232. See Young, Ordinary Diet, supra note 26, at 319-20 (listing profederalism canons, including 
many invoked by the Rehnquist Court, such as “rules disfavoring interpretations of federal 
statutes that would impose conditions on states’ acceptance of federal funds, subject the states 
to statutory liability under federal law, abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity, regulate the 
traditional functions of state government, intrude on traditional concerns of state criminal 
law, or regulate at the outer limits of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
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Any unarticulated interests in a Rule will nearly always reﬂect the interests of the 
unelected committees and the Court, not Congress, so they are less entitled to 
judicial protection in the ﬁrst place.
233
 And if these federal interests are really of 
paramount importance, creating incentives to write them into Rules ex ante or 
to amend Rules to reﬂect them is reasonable.
234
 My canon allows for federal in-
terests to be accounted for so long as they are evident in the text or Advisory 




Third, Sherry’s position is based in part on her pointed dismissal of those 
who believe they can “constrain judicial discretion by the adoption of either spe-
ciﬁc doctrines or speciﬁc methodologies.”
236
 Sherry’s skepticism of default rules 
is rooted in realist concerns that judges “can wiggle out of any constraints.”
237
 
The longstanding debate over the success of formalism in constraining judges is 
one I will not attempt to resolve here. In the case of Erie, though, my proposed 
canon sidesteps much of the difficulty in distinguishing substance and procedure 
that has plagued other formalist approaches. And, unlike some other canons that 
have drawn criticism, mine has no corresponding equal and opposite canon.
238 
Finally, as Michael Greve has noted, “normalizing Erie” would be a Hercu-
lean—if not Sisyphean—task.
239
  Scholarly advocacy of radical change is one 
thing, but “no litigator or judge has that luxury.”
240
 A crucial element of my pro-
posal is that it does not require overturning any of the key Erie precedents; it 
simply augments them in ways that draw on some of the existing approaches. 
5. Ambiguity in Identifying Ambiguous Rules 
In practice, my canon relies on judges to identify where ambiguity and com-
peting plausible interpretations exist. This is not always easy. As then-Judge Ka-
 
233. See Struve, supra note 19, at 1104 (describing the formal comment and review process for pro-
posed new Rules). 
234. See supra Section III.B.3. 
235. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
236. Sherry, supra note 215, at 1212. 
237. Id. at 1213. 
238. On the subject of equal and opposite canons, see Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of 
Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. 
REV. 395, 401-06 (1950), which famously arrayed twenty-eight canons and their counter can-
ons. 
239. See Michael S. Greve, Is Erie Normal?, 69 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 253, 263 (2016). 
240. Id. 
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vanaugh wrote, “[T]here is often no good or predictable way for judges to de-
termine whether statutory text contains ‘enough’ ambiguity to cross the line be-
yond which courts may resort to [interpretive canons].”
241
 This presents a chal-
lenge for my canon because when judges refuse to acknowledge ambiguity where 
they ought to, the canon will not be triggered. But judgment cannot be com-
pletely removed from judging. My canon’s plausibility standard should ensure 
that the canon is triggered in most appropriate cases, even if not with perfect 
accuracy (a standard too demanding for any default rule). 
D. Assessing Alternative Erie Conﬂicts Approaches 
Having laid out the primary arguments for and against a federalism-based 
avoidance canon applied at the conﬂicts stage of Erie analysis, it is worth consid-
ering alternative methodologies and how my approach stacks up. I assess three 
sets of alternatives: the concurrence and dissent in Shady Grove, nonavoidance 
approaches from the academic literature, and avoidance approaches from the ac-
ademic literature. 
1. The Shady Grove Alternatives 
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg both provided alternative approaches to Erie 
conﬂicts problems in their separate writings in Shady Grove. In this Section, I 
demonstrate why each approach, though not without its merits, fails to best re-
solve the federalism, uniformity, and separation-of-powers issues at stake. 
a. Justice Stevens’s Concurrence 
Recall from Section I.B that Justice Stevens’s approach in his Shady Grove 
concurrence was premised on reading Federal Rules narrowly to avoid conﬂict 
with rights and remedies created by state law and thus to respect state interests 
and avoid running afoul of the REA.
242
 Despite the admirable aims of Justice 
Stevens’s approach, his method ultimately falls short of its ambition to vindicate 
federalism and separation-of-powers concerns in three ways. 
First, Justice Stevens’s approach is inconsistent with Hanna and Sibbach, 
which held that Federal Rules always displace conﬂicting state law so long as 
 
241. Kavanaugh, supra note 105, at 2136; see also Gregory E. Maggs, Reducing the Costs of Statutory 
Ambiguity: Alternative Approaches and the Federal Courts Study Committee, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
123, 125 (1992) (“The term ‘statutory ambiguity’ itself could have several meanings.”). 
242. See supra Section I.B. 
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they truly regulate procedure.
243
 This holding was reaffirmed by the Court in 
Walker and Burlington Northern, as well as by the plurality in Shady Grove.
244
 And 
other Justices who have pushed for an avoidance approach at the conﬂicts stage, 
such as Justice Ginsburg,
245
 have recognized this precedent. Implementing Jus-
tice Stevens’s approach would require abandoning the Hanna-Sibbach test, a 
heavy lift given the weight of stare decisis. Indeed, Justice Stevens admitted as 
much, undertaking to distinguish Sibbach to avoid this problem.
246
 But whatever 
the merits of Justice Stevens’s position on Sibbach, his broader theory still cannot 
be squared with Hanna and subsequent Erie conﬂicts cases.
247
 
Second, in practice, Justice Stevens’s approach is highly subjective and relies 
on federal judges to accurately identify and faithfully apply the intent of numer-
ous state laws. Although Erie itself requires this to an extent,
248
 the interpretative 
difficulties caused by federal judges’ relative unfamiliarity with state laws and 
distance from the political processes that give rise to them
249
 are magniﬁed in 
the context of gauging conﬂicts between Federal Rules and state laws. When “a 
 
243. See Ely, supra note 35, at 697. 
244. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 411-12 (2010) (plu-
rality opinion); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987); Walker v. Armco Steel 
Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1980). 
245. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 438 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 
Inc. 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996). 
246. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 427-28 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment); see also Allan Ides, The Standard for Measuring the Validity of a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure: The Shady Grove Debate Between Justices Scalia and Stevens, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1041, 1059-63 (explaining how Justice Stevens distinguished Sibbach and arguing that he was 
correct). 
247. Ides argues that Hanna does not in fact apply Sibbach as Justice Scalia did in Shady Grove, 
because the state right at issue in Hanna was service, a “classically procedural right.” This 
response is insufficient, though, because it both neglects subsequent applications that were 
less obviously procedural (e.g., Burlington Northern) and elides the actual operation of the test 
in Hanna. While a clearly state procedural right may make the outcome obvious (i.e., may 
make the test easy to pass), that does not mean that the test is not being applied. See Ides, 
supra note 246, at 1062-63. 
248. Although it may seem odd to quibble with federal judicial interpretation of state law given 
Erie’s main holding, my objection is not to the act of interpretation at all but to speciﬁc con-
texts in which such interpretation may incorrectly cut against the ultimate application of state 
law under Erie. My approach seeks to avoid such situations. 
249. See Young, supra note 8, at 55; supra Section III.B.3; cf. Lea Brilmayer & Charles Seidell, Juris-
dictional Realism: Where Modern Theories of Choice of Law Went Wrong, and What Can Be Done 
to Fix Them, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (arguing that statutes often do not yield 
clear answers regarding relevant forum interests and that ﬁlling in these gaps is often an act 
of discretionary policymaking that is acceptable where judges interpret domestic law but not 
foreign law). 
an avoidance canon for erie 
531 
State chooses to use a traditionally procedural vehicle as a means of deﬁning the 
scope of substantive rights or remedies,”
250
 the facial operation of the statute 
(procedural) purposefully differs from its intended effect (substantive), making 
intent especially hard to evaluate. Justice Stevens even acknowledged that “there 
are costs involved in attempting to discover the true nature of a state procedural 
rule” and consequently argued that in order for a state procedural law to be 
deemed substantive within the meaning of the REA, “there must be little doubt” 
about its purposes.
251
 But what constitutes sufficiently little doubt is itself sub-
jective. And his earlier point that a state law may meet this standard if it is merely 
“intertwined with a state right or remedy” such that “it functions to deﬁne the 
scope of the state-created right” makes the burden of this analysis on federal 
courts even greater.
252
 The same challenges highlighted in Section III.B.3 apply 
here in full. When judges are not inclined to heed state interests or fail to accu-
rately identify them, under this approach those interests can still be ignored. 
Third, albeit less troublingly, Justice Stevens’s approach collapses the neat 
separation of the Erie two-step analysis set forth in Walker. He admitted as 
much, noting that if the conﬂicts analysis were to be done in light of the sub-
stantive thrust of the Federal Rule and state law, “the second step of the inquiry 
may well bleed back into the ﬁrst.”
253
 But, for the reasons elaborated in Section 
I.B.2, his ordering problem should be avoided where possible (and can be 
avoided under my approach). 
b. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent 
Justice Ginsburg’s methodology faces similar challenges, particularly the 
problems of inconsistency, potential error, and judicial economy identiﬁed 
 
250. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 420 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
251. Id. at 432. 
252. Id. at 423. There is a long history of judicial and scholarly doubt about the readiness of federal 
courts for such undertakings. See J. Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Qual-
ity of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 317, 322-326 (1967) (“It has even been contended that Erie 
obliges . . . the federal court to digest and master the entire corpus of state law; my fear is that 
we on the federal bench lack the acuity, leisure, and stamina for undertaking these intellectual 
ordeals.”); see also HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 143 (1973) 
(“Diversity jurisdiction . . . ‘can badly squander the resources of the federal judiciary’ . . . .” 
(quoting Wright, supra, at 323)); sources cited supra note 195. And commentators have 
acknowledged this difficulty in the context of Justice Stevens’s Shady Grove approach. See 
Clermont, supra note 139, at 1014-15. 
253. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 422. 




 Although somewhat less conceptually demanding than Justice Ste-
vens’s approach in terms of the understanding of state law required to execute 
it, her approach incorporates two additional sources of potential error. First, it 
requires judges to fully assess the substantive purposes of both the state law and 
the Federal Rule in question.
255
 Second, it asks that they appropriately weigh 
these substantive purposes against each other in determining the scope of per-
missible Rule interpretations.
256
 Neither of these endeavors is easy and both are 
highly subjective (and, thus, prone to inconsistency and error relative to a default 
rule). 
In some ways, however, this approach is not dissimilar from the one advo-
cated in this Note. Justice Ginsburg’s conﬂicts methodology also relies on a pre-
sumption against conﬂict, albeit one implemented by seeking nonconﬂicting in-
terpretations based on substantive content.
257
 My approach differs both in its 
use of a facially applied default rule and in the sort of Erie errors it produces on 
the margin. Broadly speaking, Erie cases allow for two types of erroneous results: 
the incorrect displacement of state substantive law and the incorrect application 
of state procedural law in federal courts. In terms of outcomes, the primary dif-
ference between Justice Ginsburg’s approach and mine is that my approach will 
produce less erroneous displacement of state substantive law and more errone-
ous application of state procedural law. An avoidance approach that militates to-
ward the application of state law without asking whether it is substantive or pro-
cedural—assuming a nonconﬂicting reading exists—all but ensures some state 
procedural laws will be incorrectly applied. In my view, the federalism interest 
in preserving the application of state substantive law is worth the cost of allow-
ing some state procedural law to apply in federal court, even where not strictly 
necessary, where it has not been unambiguously displaced. If forced to choose, 
the former errors are far more consequential for our federal-state balance than 
the latter because incorrect displacement of state substantive law contravenes 
important state policy interests. Harms to federal procedural law are less conse-
quential. 
At bottom, Shady Grove’s concurrence and dissent both rely too heavily on 
the subjective identiﬁcation and weighing of laws’ substantive purposes. Because 
similar normative goals can be accomplished with a federalism-based default 
 
254. See supra Section III.B.3. Justice Ginsburg’s approach is essentially the same as that proposed 
by Adam Steinman, although his technique separates into two steps the process of (1) identi-
fying the principles underlying the state law and (2) determining the preemptive scope of the 
Federal Rule based on its purposes and objectives. See Steinman, supra note 2, at 1167-73. 
255. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 442-52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
256. See id. at 449-50. 
257. See supra Section I.B. 
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rule, the potential error costs inherent in these approaches are not worth bearing. 
A conﬂicts analysis premised on divining substantive intent is, as Justice Scalia 
wrote, “destined to produce ‘confusion worse confounded.’”
258
 
2. Nonavoidance Conﬂicts Approaches for Erie Questions 
Several academic commentators have written on the need for a unifying ap-
proach for assessing Erie conﬂicts.
259
 Most of these proposals, however, face fa-
miliar pitfalls. 
At one end of the spectrum, Joseph Bauer argues that courts adjudicating 
Erie questions should apply classical “interest analysis.”
260
 This is essentially the 
approach of the dissent in Shady Grove: to “look at the comparative strengths of 
the federal and state interests” at issue.
261
 While tempting as a way to accommo-
date the interests that really matter in a potential Erie conﬂict, this approach ul-
timately suffers from the classic problems of subjectivity, inconsistency, and er-
ror.
262
 Bauer criticizes Justice Scalia’s brusque treatment of the New York policy 
interests in Shady Grove, but Bauer’s proposed approach allows for precisely this 
kind of subjective reasoning.
263
 Interest analysis is simply too unreliable (and 
unreliably implemented) to resolve Erie conﬂicts in a satisfying manner.
264
 
Jeffrey Stempel takes a different tack, supporting a formalist approach to 
construction of the Federal Rules, which he takes from Justice Scalia’s analysis 
in Shady Grove.
265
 This methodology would afford great deference to Federal 
Rules, applying them broadly and biting the bullet on the rampant displacement 
of state law under Hanna’s interpretation of the REA.
266
 Stempel’s formalism is 
motivated by the democratic process beneﬁts of forcing state policy out of the 
 
258. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 404 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). 
259. See Bauer, supra note 6, at 1239; Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 3, at 708; Genetin, supra 
note 103, at 1068; Roosevelt, supra note 1, at 3; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Shady Grove and the Po-
tential Democracy-Enhancing Beneﬁts of Erie Formalism, 44 AKRON L. REV. 907, 916-17 (2011); 
Thomas, supra note 4, at 190-93. 
260. Bauer, supra note 6, at 1239; accord Lynch, supra note 12, at 321-26. 
261. Bauer, supra note 6, at 1265. 
262. See supra Section III.D.1. 
263. See Bauer, supra note 44, at 954 (“[R]emarkably, the plurality asserted that these claims [re-
garding the substantive reasons for § 901(b)] were irrelevant.”). 
264. Interest analysis more broadly has come under ﬁre for these very reasons. See Lea Brilmayer, 
Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without Foundations, 46 OHIO ST. L. REV. 459, 461-62 
(1985). 
265. See Stempel, supra note 259, at 967-71. 
266. See id. at 973. 
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shadow of procedure and into the sunshine of substantive law. If a state really 
wants to protect its interests, it will have to pass clearly substantive laws. This is 
a collateral beneﬁt but not sufficient to resolve our primary concerns with Erie, 
given that states may not respond to this incentive and federal courts may still 
displace their laws under the Hanna-Sibbach test. 
Stempel also seeks to avoid the challenges raised above regarding interest 
analysis, namely the “cost of committing the evaluator to substantial examina-
tion of state lawmaking and public policy and . . . the risk of inconsistent or in-
accurate assessments shaped by the values of the assessor.”
267
 But Stempel runs 
too far in the other direction. He admits that his approach would lead to greater 
displacement of state law but fails to grapple with the preference this would af-
ford Federal Rules at both stages of the Erie analysis.
268
 In some ways, this ap-
proach is the opposite of avoidance: it creates conﬂicts where none are necessary. 
Earl Dudley and George Rutherglen’s “strict interpretation” approach fo-
cuses on minimizing “narrow and esoteric interpretations” of the Federal Rules 
that disrupt the uniformity of procedure in federal courts.
269
 They would pair 
this general refusal to adopt artiﬁcially narrow interpretations of the Federal 
Rules with a greater willingness to invalidate them under the REA.
270
 There is 
clear merit to this idea: it gives protection to state policies that straddle the hazy 
line between substance and procedure while generally preserving the uniformity 
of federal procedure. 
Still, strict interpretation is not without drawbacks. Dudley and Rutherglen 
focus on the Court’s most egregious abuses of “ambiguity” and argue that the 
need for a generalized interpretive approach is less pressing than some would 
have us believe.
271
 The Court’s reasoning in Semtek was strained, as no shortage 
of scholars have pointed out, but possible conﬂicts like those in Shady Grove and 
the aforementioned anti-SLAPP cases are not so easily resolved based on the text 
alone.
272
 Their approach also has the undesirable effect of forcing additional 
rulemaking where a narrow interpretation might have sufficed (because invali-
dated rules will need to be replaced or revised), which itself is not a costless en-
 
267. Id. at 970. 
268. See id. at 971 (admitting that “this can perhaps permit decisions that ride roughshod over 
strong state interests embedded within a procedural rule or code”). 
269. Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 3, at 737. 
270. See id. at 741. 
271. See id. at 722 (characterizing the Court’s approach in Semtek as “search[ing] for, and then . . . 
exaggerat[ing], any ambiguity”). 
272. See, e.g., Burbank & Wolff, supra note 37, at 51. 




 Further, application of each new Rule requires courts to ascertain its 
appropriate scope anew, and it is preferable to minimize the instances in which 
the courts must undergo this interpretive process.
274
 Finally, implementing this 
approach would require a departure from the Court’s existing precedent. The 
application of the REA in Hanna and Shady Grove would have to be abandoned, 
likely an insurmountable obstacle. 
Finally, Kermit Roosevelt advocates a two-step approach based on choice-
of-law methods. In his view, the question at the conﬂicts analysis stage is 
“whether federal law or state law grants rights to the parties, or whether both 
laws do.”
275
 In the latter case, the second step then assigns priority to one or the 
other. This schema is analytically useful in that it disaggregates the question of 
conﬂicts from the question of prioritizing the Federal Rule or state law. But it 
does not tell us what to do when it is unclear whether one body or the other 
grants rights or whether those rights actually conﬂict. Some methodology is still 
needed to resolve ambiguity. 
3. Avoidance Approaches for Erie Questions 
Finally, it is worth examining two existing Erie avoidance approaches in the 
literature to see how my federalism-based avoidance canon stacks up. 
a. REA Avoidance 
In one of the few articles that directly addresses the question of interpretive 
canons for Erie conﬂicts under the REA, Bernadette Bollas Genetin argues that 
a court should construe Federal Rules such that “in cases of serious doubt re-
garding Rule validity, it will give the nod to protecting Congress’s superior sub-
stantive lawmaking authority” by not intruding on congressional lawmaking 
powers.
276
 Genetin takes issue with the form of avoidance based on state inter-
ests used by the dissent in Shady Grove on the grounds that the intent of the REA 
was to enforce the separation of powers between Congress and the judiciary, not 
 
273. See Maggs, supra note 241, at 129-30 (discussing the “replacement costs” incurred when the 
lawmakers must undo the decisions of courts with additional lawmaking). 
274. See Moore, supra note 221, at 1073 (observing the “difficult questions involving the interpre-
tation and application of various Federal Rules,” which would be magniﬁed by a proliferation 
of new Rules). 
275. See Roosevelt, supra note 1, at 12. 
276. Genetin, supra note 103, at 1126; see also Struve, supra note 19, at 1147. 




 In her view, any interpretive canon adopted for Erie 
cases should focus on policing the limits of Congress’s incomplete delegation of 
lawmaking power to the Court.
278
 
This is certainly a worthy goal, particularly because the question of whether 
and when the Court exceeds the scope of its delegation to displace state law is of 
constitutional magnitude.
279
 But it does not tell us whether there is a conﬂict in 
the ﬁrst place, despite Genetin’s recognition of the Court’s shortcomings in this 
area.
280
 Indeed, under a crisply deﬁned two-stage Erie analysis that employs 
avoidance at the conﬂicts stage, courts often will not need to rule on the REA 
question at all. And, as discussed above, the separation-of-powers concern un-




b. Traditional State-Authority Avoidance 
A second existing Erie avoidance approach is Margaret Thomas’s proposal 
that courts institute a presumption in favor of state law where the law in question 
relates to traditional areas of state regulation, especially states’ police powers.
282
 
Thomas roots her approach in the core premise that Congress’s delegation to the 
judiciary under the REA was never intended to be a full delegation of Congress’s 
power to regulate federal court procedures and displace contrary state law.
283
 She 
argues that the REA’s proscription of Federal Rules that infringe upon substan-
tive rights ought to be interpreted as cabining Federal Rules to areas where Con-
 
277. See Genetin, supra note 103, at 1126-27. 
278. See id. 
279. See Issacharoff, supra note 114, at 217 (“Erie emerges as a caution on a particular exercise of 
federal power through federal courts . . . . Erie becomes a case [about] . . . the dangers inher-
ent in the further reaches of federal judicial power.”). 
280. See Genetin, supra note 103, at 1074 (observing that the Court’s use of conﬂicts avoidance “has 
been uneven” and “has taken on an ad hoc quality that provides little guidance to lower 
courts”). 
281. See supra Section II.A. 
282. See Thomas, supra note 4, at 250 (explaining the approach and providing examples of tradi-
tional areas of state regulation, including “health and safety, property transfer and zoning, 
insurance, domestic relations, probate, workers’ compensation, and premises liability”). 
283. See id. at 241-42 (“This difference demonstrates that Congress delegated less than the full 
measure of its full constitutional power.”). 
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This approach would yield similar results to my proposal but entails difficul-
ties that a strict federalism-based avoidance canon does not. 
First, this approach requires courts to engage in the fraught task of deter-
mining (a) whether a given law is indeed an integral part of a state’s regulation; 
and (b) whether that regulation is within traditional areas of state control.
285
 
The former determination is vulnerable to the same errors and biases as other 
relatively open-ended interest-based inquiries. It places an exceptionally high 
burden on judges to understand the particular functions of state laws within 
state regulatory schemes, increasing the likelihood of error. Meanwhile, the latter 
determination is so subjective and difficult that the Court explicitly abandoned 
it in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.
286
 There is little reason 
to resurrect it here or believe it will be any more effective as a dividing line be-
tween state and federal authority. 
Second, this approach does not resolve conﬂicts questions where the state 
law is not within the zone of traditional state regulation. For those cases, 
Thomas’s approach still leaves us without guidance. A default rule of general 
 
284. See id. at 242 (“The correct question is not whether the state procedure falls in some state 
enclave reserved by the Constitution to the states. Rather, given the constitutional list of enu-
merated federal powers, has Congress acted pursuant to one of those enumerated powers to 
intrude legitimately into all the states’ domains the Rules might reach, or has it chosen to leave 
some of those domains unaffected by federal power?”). Of course, after stating that her ap-
proach does not rely on the notion of a state enclave, Thomas proposes that courts avoid dis-
placing the “small body of state laws that accomplish some regulatory goal in a traditional 
state area Congress has chosen not to regulate.” Id. at 250. Doctrinally, this approach creates 
an enclave by carving out a delineated area based on traditional practice. 
285. See id. at 252 (“[T]he state practice in these special areas should be applied not only where it 
is ‘unmistakably clear’ that the practice is integral to the state’s regulatory structure, but also 
where it seems reasonably likely that it is. Where a rational state legislature likely used a given 
practice to accomplish state regulatory interests in an area of special state autonomy, and the 
practice is functioning to further that regulatory interest, the state practice should be fol-
lowed.”). 
286. 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985) (concluding that “the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regu-
latory immunity in terms of ‘traditional governmental function’ is . . . unworkable”). Thomas 
attempts to preempt this critique by arguing that the difficulty in Garcia was sui generis and 
complicated by the fact that the Fair Labor Standards Act had already been applied to some 
state employees. In her view, identifying areas within the historic police power would be eas-
ier. But this is unpersuasive given the often murky connections between procedural rules and 
substantive goals and the need that Thomas’s approach would create for judges to classify 
these goals once they are identiﬁed. Where the classiﬁcation is unclear, looking to factors like 
“whether the state is using a regulation to solve a broader social problem” simply is not 
enough to make the approach workable. Thomas, supra note 4, at 254. 
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applicability will go further in resolving Erie conﬂicts while sidestepping the 
trickiest part of Thomas’s inquiry. 
The bottom line is this: existing Erie conﬂicts approaches either retain the 
same problematic subjectivity and weak protection of federalism that has bedev-
iled the courts for decades or will be limited in their effect so long as the Hanna-
Sibbach test is good law. Several fail to address the full scope of potential con-
ﬂicts. The aim of my canon is to address these shortcomings with a formal de-
fault rule in favor of federalism concerns, applicable for all potential conﬂicts, 
that operates before courts reach the Hanna-Sibbach test. 
iv.  the operation of the canon in resolving erie  conflicts 
Having argued for the application of a federalism-based avoidance canon for 
Erie conﬂicts, let me now demonstrate how this canon would be operationalized. 
Beyond theoretical justiﬁcation, a critical beneﬁt of this canon is its simplicity in 
practice. My objections to Justices Stevens’s and Ginsburg’s approaches are op-
erational, not normative. As such, it is important to demonstrate the operability 
of my avoidance canon and how it would function as a default rule to avoid the 
practical issues previously discussed. To do so, I apply the canon to two potential 
conﬂicts between the California, D.C., and Maine anti-SLAPP statutes and Fed-
eral Rules 12 and 56. 
A. No Conﬂict Between Special Motions to Dismiss and Rule 12 
All three of these anti-SLAPP statutes create a “special motion to dismiss” 
(or “strike,” in the case of California) that must be ﬁled within a deﬁned period 
after service of the complaint.
287
 These special motions operate similarly to Rule 
12(b)(6) motions. They are generally ﬁled before discovery and require the non-
movant to demonstrate that their claim is viable, creating a higher barrier than 
Rule 12(b)(6) to the continuation of the suit.
288
 Several courts have confronted 
 
287. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2016); D.C. CODE § 16-5502 (2012); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2003). 
288. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (providing that the motion is granted “unless the 
court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff 
will prevail on the claim”); D.C. CODE § 16-5502(b) (providing that the motion is granted 
“unless the responding party demonstrates that the claim is likely to succeed on the merits”); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (providing that the motion is granted “unless the party 
against whom the special motion is made shows that the moving party’s exercise of its right 
of petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law and that 
the moving party’s acts caused actual injury to the responding party”). 
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the question whether these special motions to dismiss can apply in federal diver-
sity actions or whether they conﬂict with, and are displaced by, Rule 12.
289
 
The ﬁrst question under the Erie avoidance canon is whether there is a read-
ing of the Federal Rule that can be plausibly supported by the text and Advisory 
Committee Notes that does not conﬂict with the state law in question. On its 
face, Rule 12’s language does not preclude additional motions to dismiss created 
by state law. The prefatory clause to 12(b)—which states that “a party may assert 
the following defenses by motion”
290
—does not necessarily imply that only these 
defenses may be asserted. Indeed, the Rule easily could have been written to ex-
plicitly exclude other defenses. If defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions fail, Rule 12 
motions are still available to them, illustrating their separate rather than concur-
rent function.
291
 Parsing the issue further to address a possible conﬂict with just 
Rule 12(b)(6), the court in Godin v. Schencks noted that anti-SLAPP motions are 
textually premised on speciﬁc activities; they do not substitute for Rule 
12(b)(6)’s general procedural mechanism for testing the sufficiency of com-
plaints.
292
 These provisions are, at least plausibly, not answering the same ques-
tion. To the extent they do fall within the Federal Rules’ scheme for testing the 
sufficiency of a complaint, anti-SLAPP motions are far more akin to summary 
judgment motions than Rule 12 motions to dismiss. If preemption of special mo-
tions to dismiss is the intent of Rule 12, it should be updated to say so.
293
 
This is not to say the D.C. Circuit’s opposing conclusion in Abbas v. Foreign 
Policy Group, LLC necessarily misreads Rule 12. It is certainly a plausible reading 
of the Rule to say that it exclusively governs “the circumstances under which a 
court must dismiss a plaintiff’s claim before trial.”
294
 But this is not the only plau-
sible reading. It is also plausible to argue that Rule 12 and state anti-SLAPP stat-
utes can coexist because they cover different motions and procedures. The ap-
plication of the Erie avoidance canon does not invalidate the analysis of readings  
 
 
289. See supra Introduction. 
290. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b). 
291. See United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 972 (9th 
Cir. 1999). 
292. 629 F.3d 79, 88-89 (1st Cir. 2010). 
293. The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1946 Amendment of Rule 12 discuss at length that 
when extraneous factual material is necessary to dispose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a motion 
under Rule 12(b)(6) is thus converted into a summary judgment motion.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12 
advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment. This discussion says nothing about foreclo-
sure of motions with a similar function and may even be read, in light of its ﬂexibility, to be 
capacious enough to encompass other special motions to dismiss. 
294. 783 F.3d 1328, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
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that result in conﬂict—it creates a default rule against applying them when there 
are plausible alternatives. Because the text of Rule 12 can plausibly be read to 
create room for the operation of state law, federal courts confronting this issue 
should default to the nonconﬂicting reading and apply anti-SLAPP special mo-
tion provisions. 
B. Conﬂict Between Discovery-Staying Provisions and Rule 56 
The question of conﬂict between the discovery-staying provisions of anti-
SLAPP laws and Rule 56’s discovery provisions for summary judgment motions 
is another matter entirely. The three state statutes at issue each stay discovery 
until the special motion has been disposed of, subject to the court’s discretion to 
allow limited discovery after a showing of good cause.
295
 Critically, the statutory 
standards to overcome these motions rely on an assessment of the probability of 
success on the merits and extant factual support for the claim, rather than the 
claim’s facial plausibility.
296
  Rule 12(d) stipulates that motions under Rule 
12(b)(6) or 12(c) involving matters outside the pleadings shall be treated as Rule 
56 motions for summary judgment.
297
 If the special motions substitute for or 
conﬂict with any existing motions, it is these. As such, the question arises 
whether the discovery-staying provisions of anti-SLAPP statutes conﬂict with 
provisions allowing for discovery under Rule 56.
298
 
Sufficient opportunity for discovery is an integral element of Rule 56.
299
 On 
its face, Rule 56(f) provides for a grant of summary judgment “[a]fter giving 
notice and a reasonable time to respond.”
300
 In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., the 
Court held that Rule 56(f) provides that “summary judgment be refused where 
the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover information that 
 
295. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2016); D.C. CODE § 16-5502 (2012); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2003). 
296. See supra note 288 and accompanying text. 
297. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). 
298. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d)(2). 
299. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (“Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of sum-
mary judgment, after adequate time for discovery . . . .” (emphasis added)); Samuel Issacharoff 
& George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 74 (1990) 
(“Summary judgment provides a mechanism for the courts to review cases prior to trial once 
the parties have concluded the discovery necessary to establish the existence of material issues 
in dispute.”). 
300. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f). 
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is essential to his opposition.”
301
 And even beyond the clear textual evidence 
providing for summary judgment only after sufficient discovery in Rule 56(f), 
the entirety of Rule 56 is replete with textual evidence suggesting that oppor-
tunity for discovery is a prerequisite for summary judgment. Rule 56(a) provides 
that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there 
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.”
302
 Not only does this imply dis-
covery to allow such a showing, but Rule 56(c)(1)(A) speciﬁcally provides that 
this showing must be supported by “citing to particular parts of materials in the 
record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, af-
ﬁdavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or 
other materials.”
303
 The text of Rule 56 cannot plausibly be read to suggest that 
a summary judgment motion can be granted without discovery, and the Court 
affirmed this reading in Anderson. 
Given this interpretation of the Rule’s text, it becomes implausible to arrive 
at any reading that allows discovery-staying provisions to apply simultane-
ously.
304
  Although the First Circuit reached the opposite result in Godin v. 
Schencks, it mistakenly focused too narrowly on one provision of Rule 56 while 
neglecting the text of the Rule as a whole.
305
 The First Circuit held that Rule 56 
did not conﬂict with the discovery-staying provisions for two reasons. First, the 
court thought that “[i]nherent in Rule 56 is that a fact-ﬁnder’s evaluation of ma-
terial factual disputes is not required.”
306
 This is true but premised on the devel-
opment of a sufficient factual record to justify such a conclusion. When discov-
ery-staying provisions interfere with the development of that record, such a 
conclusion cannot rationally be reached. Second, the court construed the Maine 
statute as not conﬂicting with Rule 56 on the ground that its provisions for lim-
ited discovery upon a showing of good cause still provide for sufficient discovery 
 
301. 477 U.S. 242, 250 n.5 (1986); see also Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 846 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (noting that, in Anderson, “the Supreme Court . . . restated the rule as requiring, 
rather than merely permitting, discovery”). 
302. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
303. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A). 
304. See Metabolife Int’l, 264 F.3d at 846. 
305. 629 F.3d 79, 89 (1st Cir. 2010). In general, the fact that a panel of federal judges has adopted 
a given interpretation is strong evidence that it is at least plausible. But it is not dispositive. If 
it were, the mere fact of a court’s ruling that an interpretation is plausible would make that 
ruling unreviewable. In this case, the First Circuit’s error regarding discovery and summary 
judgment seems to be rooted in its focus on Rule 56(d)’s similar provisions to Maine law, 
rather than Rule 56 as a whole. And it is Rule 56 as a whole that makes compatibility implau-
sible. 
306. Id. 




 On this view, the burden of proof under Maine’s law is the 
same as that under Rule 56(d) (where a court can defer a summary judgment 
motion or order additional discovery upon a nonmovant’s showing that it can-
not present facts required to overcome the motion). In any case, the court said, 
“If a federal court would allow discovery under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d) then, in our 
view, that would constitute good cause under the Maine statute.”
308
 
But the plain text of Rule 56 clearly contemplates an opportunity for discov-
ery prior to initial consideration of the summary judgment motion. The fact that 
the burden is on the nonmovant to justify an extension of discovery later does 
not change that fact. Maine’s statute allows a defendant to force a plaintiff to 
justify the proof of the plaintiff’s claim or the need for discovery prior to any 
fact-ﬁnding, contrary to Rule 56. If these discovery-staying provisions are to 
have any procedural effect at all, one must believe they conﬂict with the Federal 
Rules. 
Under any plausible interpretation, Rule 56 unavoidably conﬂicts with the 
state laws at issue. While it is possible to read Rule 56 in a nonconﬂicting manner, 
it is not plausible. Implausibility is a higher bar than impossibility. An implausi-
ble reading is one that is so strained in light of the text and facially evident func-
tion of the Rule that it cannot be reasonably maintained, even if it can be imag-
ined. For the reasons described above, the First Circuit’s interpretation of Rule 
56 cannot be reasonably maintained. 
Having found a conﬂict, we then proceed to the REA stage of Erie analysis. 
Applying the Hanna-Sibbach test—whether a rule “really regulates procedure”—
Rule 56 is clearly valid under the Rules Enabling Act.
309
 It is indisputable that its 
provisions for summary judgment are facially procedural. As such, under this 
test, Rule 56 would displace state discovery-staying provisions in anti-SLAPP 
laws. This might go differently under Justice Stevens’s approach; indeed, that is 
exactly what the court held in Godin.
310
 Although less textually clear than the 
D.C. or California anti-SLAPP laws, Maine’s statute as a whole evinces a sub-
stantive purpose.
311
 I remain comfortable with the Hanna-Sibbach test, both be-
cause stare decisis concerns militate away from approaches that would require 
 
307. See id. at 90-91. 
308. Id. 
309. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941). 
310. See Godin, 629 F.3d at 89 (“Because Section 556 is ‘so intertwined with a state right or remedy 
that it functions to deﬁne the scope of the state-created right,’ it cannot be displaced 
by . . . Rule 56.” (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 
393, 423 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))). 
311. The statute’s special provisions apply only to claims “based on the moving party’s exercise of 
the moving party’s right of petition under the Constitution of the United States or the Con-
stitution of Maine.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2003). 
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disavowing it and because I believe a federalism-based avoidance canon can pro-
vide the necessary protection for state law without risking the invalidation of 
Federal Rules. As such, under this canon, Rule 56 would displace discovery-stay-
ing provisions. 
conclusion 
This Note proposes a federalism-based avoidance canon to resolve potential 
conﬂicts between Federal Rules and state law. My approach both addresses the 
confusion in the Court’s Erie doctrine highlighted in Shady Grove and equalizes 
the structural protections afforded to constitutional values, including federalism 
and the separation of powers, that undergirded the original Erie decision. At pre-
sent, the Court’s decisions in Sibbach, Hanna, and Shady Grove afford a nearly 
insurmountable advantage to Federal Rules ostensibly in conﬂict with state laws, 
leading to unnecessary displacement of state laws representing important rights, 
interests, and policies. This imbalance can be rectiﬁed without undue disruption 
of precedent by inserting a countervailing default rule in favor of state law at the 
conﬂicts stage of Erie analysis. 
There are three beneﬁts to this approach. First, a federalism-based avoidance 
canon affords the requisite protection to democratically instantiated state inter-
ests without unduly burdening the federal interest in a uniform system of federal 
procedure. By relying on the relatively streamlined rulemaking process to correct 
interpretive errors, this approach achieves a reasonable compromise between 
Erie’s twin goals of federalism and uniformity. Second, this approach better ac-
cords with existing interpretive canons—in particular the constitutional-doubts 
and antipreemption canons—and Erie precedents. This point is especially im-
portant to Erie’s underlying judicial-federalism concerns. If one reads Erie to 
limit the ability of the judiciary to displace state law beyond the boundaries set 
by congressional action, it follows that one should presume in favor of state law 
where Federal Rules as written do not unambiguously displace state law. Finally, 
this canon minimizes the risk of inconsistent application and judicial error by 
removing the need for subjective interest-based analyses or the complex, case-
by-case balancing decisions that have plagued alternative approaches. 
If adopted by federal courts, this approach will minimize the occurrence of 
the irksome Erie splits that have plagued lower courts in recent years. This ap-
proach also helps clarify the distinct stages of analysis in Erie cases in a principled 
and generalizable manner. My hope is that this interpretive intervention offers a 
small step forward in achieving Erie’s original aims: to clarify and simplify the 
choice of law in diversity actions. 
